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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The Federation is the cornerstone of the Australian nation and at the very heart of our 
constitutional democracy, both historically and culturally. However, it is increasingly not 
working well and needs updating and modernising. The balance of power within the 
Federation has shifted increasingly to the centre, with an accompanying degree of 
resentment and distrust by the States and Territories. The roles and responsibilities of the 
tiers of government have become confused and unclear, and the co-operation and 
collaboration of recent decades is badly faltering. Importantly, the delivery of policy outcomes 
to local communities is sadly lacking, and becoming increasingly characterised by 
duplication, confusion and ineffectiveness. Moreover, the States and local governments no 
longer have the wherewithal, especially revenue sources, to deliver on the tasks assigned to 
them. Out of all of this, the period of great economic reforms is now under serious threat of 
grounding to a halt, with a lack of political and community purpose to progress efficiency and 
productivity in order to enhance the wellbeing of all Australians. 
This paper sets out to address these multiple, overlapping and interacting problems by 
proposing a complete restructuring of the Australian Federation to a new governance model, 
based on two tiers of government rather than three, and with clearly designated roles and 
responsibilities between these tiers. 
• The Federal Government would concentrate on designing, negotiating and legislating 
strategic national policy and the overall financing frameworks of that policy. 
• The cities and regional governments would concentrate on delivering the programs and 
services emanating from those national policies to citizens and communities at the local 
level, whilst also retaining full responsibility for their own policy and administration of 
urban, regional and local issues. 
The restructuring of the Federation, as proposed in the paper, would bring a feasible and 
more efficient balance between the tiers of government, that recognises the realities of 
Australia in a globalised world and that could lay the foundation for significant economic, 
social and environmental reforms. 
Chapter Two of the paper sets out the need for constitutional redesign, the details of the 
proposed restructuring of the Federation and the likely reforms required of the Constitution. It 
includes inserting provisions that would set out the structures and incentives for a more 
cohesive and workable Federation, including having clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
for the two tiers of government. It also articulates the roles and objectives of the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG), as the platform for linking the two layers of government to 
achieve a significant reform agenda. The proposed Constitutional model articulates a 
workable basis for a new Federation by seeking a balance between the principles of 
nationhood and co-operation, subsidiarity, structural efficiency, and accountability and fiscal 
equivalence.  
Chapter Three sets out the framework that could be built as an integral part of the 
constitutional reforms to ensure a credible and comprehensive fiscal framework on which to 
base the new Federation, including the framework for a national fiscal strategy and 
significant reforms to the revenue sharing powers between the two tiers of government, as 
well as the necessary reaffirmation of the role of monetary policy and financial sector 
supervision in this overall framework. 
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Chapter Four makes proposals for the structure, roles and responsibilities, and incentives 
that would be conducive to attaining an ambitious microeconomic reform agenda across the 
whole spectrum of structural policy issues. As such, the paper seeks to make the case for 
constitutional reform and a new Federal governance system on the basis that such changes 
would present enhanced opportunities for Australia to achieve the sorts of economic, social 
and environmental reforms necessary to maintain and enhance our place in a rapidly 
changing and globalising world. 
Finally, Chapter Five sets out the conclusions reached from the proposals and analysis 
contained in the paper and highlights the seven fundamental drivers for change where the 
proposed new Federation and its constitutional underpinnings could be conducive to 
capturing the benefits of productivity, efficiency and growth, as well as co-operation, 
accountability, sustainability and service delivery, that would enhance the overall wellbeing of 
the Australian people and that could endure over the longer term. 
In proposing such a radical constitutional restructuring, this paper clearly acknowledges in 
Box 2.2 that achieving such a restructuring may take some time and much persuasion, 
particularly to gain bipartisan support at both Federal and State levels. The major issue 
would be to address seriously the possibility of abolishing the States. Some would view the 
proposals in this paper to move from three tiers of government to two tiers as being almost 
impossible to achieve, even over the longer term. However, using the constitutional model as 
set out in this paper as the benchmark, it is possible to work through various alternatives to 
the full implementation of the two-tiered governance approach, that still seek to achieve 
significant elements of both constitutional and economic reform on a cities and regional 
basis. One such alternative of maintaining three tiers but having twelve States and a 
significant consolidation of local government, is set out in the Addendum to this paper. It is 
hoped that the Addendum will serve to engender a lively debate on the range of possible 
reforms that could be achieved as part of a more near to medium term agenda. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
This chapter sets out the need to undertake comprehensive constitutional reform, as well as 
the details of the proposed restructuring of the Federation and the likely reforms required of 
the Constitution. It includes inserting provisions that would outline the structures and 
incentives for a more cohesive and workable Federation, including having clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities for the two tiers of government, and articulating the roles and 
objectives of the COAG, as the platform for linking the two layers of government for 
achieving a significant reform agenda. The Chapter also sets out the details of the 
delineation of the proposed cities and regional areas of the second tier of government. There 
is also included an outline for a National Judicial System that would be needed, as the third 
pillar of governance for the new Federation, alongside the other two pillars — the Executive 
and the Legislature. The constitutional model, as proposed, seeks a workable balance 
between various principles of federation as the basis for a new Federation.  
THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
The Federation has served Australia well for the past 110 years. It has great attributes that 
should be preserved. It has brought unity while preserving diversity. It has brought political 
and social stability and democratic vitality with nine competitive but collaborating 
jurisdictions. It has brought economic progress and financial stability. The alternatives of a 
unitary State or a loose confederation are not even worth contemplating especially given our 
culture, traditions and historical context. 
While the Federation isn’t broken, it is increasingly not working well and needs updating and 
modernising. It has shortcomings probably not contemplated by the founding fathers and 
certainly not conducive to the 21st century. The balance of power within the Federation has 
shifted increasingly to the centre, and that is probably the reality of Australia as a modern 
globalised economy and society. The roles and responsibilities of the tiers of government are 
confused and unclear, and the delivery of policy outcomes to local communities is sadly 
lacking. Economic reforms are faltering, despite the best efforts at collaboration, and the 
States and local government no longer have the wherewithal, especially revenue sources, to 
deliver on the tasks assigned to them. 
In looking at how to address these problems through constitutional reform, an overarching 
objective should be to seek to open up opportunities for Australia to embed a new set of 
institutions, processes and incentive structures for policy making that would be conducive to 
capturing the benefits of productivity, efficiency and growth, as well as co-operation, 
accountability, sustainability and service delivery. This would enhance the overall wellbeing 
of the Australian people. In particular, constitutional reform needs to address: 
• How to equip the nation with a federated governance structure that would best suit 
Australia as a highly developed nation competing in a globalised world, with a need to 
move as soon as possible to a single market economy covering the whole Australian 
continent. 
• How to recognise in any reformed Constitution the realities of increased centralised 
power in modern Australia while preserving decentralised elements that keep in check 
concentrated power, and preserve choice, diversity and competition as vital elements of 
the Federation. 
• How to decide on the number of layers of government Australia needs as a sparsely 
populated, but highly urbanised, nation continent, that would best deliver services to 
5 
 
urban, regional and local communities, and bring major efficiencies to public 
administration. 
• How to allocate clearly defined roles and responsibilities between the tiers of 
government while holding each tier fully and transparently accountable for their 
performance in carrying out their designated tasks, even where it is judged best to have 
shared responsibilities. 
• How to build structures, processes and incentives into the Federation that will maximise 
collaboration amongst diverse and competing interests on major economic, social and 
environmental reforms, in the national interest. 
• How best to allocate taxation powers that will significantly reduce vertical fiscal 
imbalances and equip the subsidiary layers with the resources they need to carry out 
their constitutional role in the reformed Federation.  
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM MODEL 
In an attempt to address these issues, this paper argues that the proposed restructuring of 
the Federation to a cities and regional basis would bring a more efficient balance between 
the tiers of government, that recognises the realities of Australia in a globalised world. The 
paper doesn’t argue for a dismantling of the Federation, and recognises the clear benefits 
that the Federation has delivered to the nation. However, it argues that the Federation needs 
to be revamped and repaired. There needs to be injected into the Constitution factors that 
would result in a rebalancing of the powers between the tiers of government and address the 
trade-offs to bring that rebalancing about. This would include moving the Federation towards 
a more centralised model, but at the same time strengthening the decentralisation elements 
of the Federation under the second tier of government so that it can deliver appropriately to 
the citizens and communities of our cities and regions. 
The Australian Constitution covers important provisions on the role of the Governor-General, 
the Commonwealth Parliament and its powers, the Executive Government, the Judiciary and 
the States. Most of these provisions would need to be substantially revamped in order to 
move to a two-tiered constitutional model.  
Under the proposed redrafting of the Constitution, the Federation would be redesigned, with 
the States and Territories, and local government, abolished and a new two tier system of 
government established, as follows: 
• The Federal Government would have defined powers over major areas of national 
significance and importance. Any residual powers would also reside with the Federal 
Government. 
• At the cities and regional government level, there would be five City Councils and 
nineteen Regional Councils with powers, as delegated from the Federal jurisdiction, 
over the delivery of significant national policy programs and services to local 
communities. In addition, they would have prime constitutional responsibility for their 
own policies and programs relating specifically to urban, regional and local issues. 
The respective roles between the Federal Government and the City and Regional Councils 
would be clearly defined under the new Constitution. Constitutional powers would still be set 
out under major ‘subject’ headings. Under the constitutional model as proposed in this paper, 
the allocation of these powers between the Federal jurisdiction and the cities and regional 
jurisdictions would be determined against the following two principles: 
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1. Powers of national strategic significance should be allocated to the Federal 
jurisdiction: national strategic significance would include powers central to the good 
governance and security of Australia as a sovereign nation, such as foreign affairs 
and defence; powers over issues relating to our place in the globalised world such as 
national economic management; powers over areas of national strategic policy 
importance that need to be applied on a nationwide basis, such as education, health 
and social welfare; and powers over issues that have multi-jurisdictional implications, 
such as water and the environment. 
2. Powers of urban, regional and local relevance should be allocated to the city and 
regional jurisdictions: these powers would essentially relate to issues that are 
contained within these jurisdictions with no multi-jurisdictional spillover effects, or they 
are issues that are contained within the relationships between neighbouring 
jurisdictions only, such as public transport, urban infrastructure, and town planning. 
Within these ‘subject’ powers, roles and responsibilities could then be allocated on a 
‘functional’ basis. The Federal Government would be tasked to concentrate on national policy 
design, legislative frameworks and financing regimes. The City and Regional Councils would 
be tasked with implementing and delivering these national policies and programs, as well as 
their own policies and programs, at the urban, regional and local levels. 
To give effect to this constitutional model, roles and responsibilities would be defined under 
one of the following three categories, as tabulated in Attachment A. 
• Federal Powers: over major areas of national policy where both policy and 
administrative delivery would clearly rest with the Federal Government, such as foreign 
affairs and defence, national economic management, business and financial regulation, 
industrial relations, resources, energy, water, postal services and communications. 
• City and Regional Council Powers: particularly covering urban, regional and local 
issues such as public transport, urban infrastructure, town and regional planning, urban 
development, and community and municipal services. 
• Shared Powers: where policy and legislation would constitutionally rest with the 
Federal Government but where flexibility provisions under the Constitution would 
require periodic agreements to be made between the two tiers of government for 
program and service delivery as delegated to the City and Regional Councils, with 
funding shared where appropriate. Important powers here could include education, 
health, social welfare, immigration, land use management and the environment. How 
such delegated arrangements would work in practice would be left to negotiation in the 
particular circumstances. Even though responsibilities would be shared, the negotiated 
arrangements would obviously need to build in accountability and performance 
mechanisms for each level of government. 
With any changes to the Constitution, there can be no guarantee that the roles allocated to 
each tier of government will remain relevant forever. However, in the current circumstances, 
and the likely circumstances unfolding for the 21st century, the allocation of powers as 
proposed above would be far more workable and relevant for Australia as a modern nation 
than the division as handed to us by the founding fathers. Clearly, however, defining roles 
and responsibilities isn’t meant to be a magic cure-all, but just one element of the needed 
constitutional reform package. The proposed allocation of powers between the two tiers of 
government would assist in avoiding disputes, but it wouldn’t end the need for High Court 
7 
 
interpretations, which after all have an important fundamental role to play in the living 
evolution of the Federation.  
Revenue powers would also be clearly divided between the two tiers of government. The 
Federal Government would have direct constitutional power for raising personal and 
business income taxes, customs and excise duties, and resource taxes. The City and 
Regional Councils would be constitutionally empowered to raise consumption taxes, land 
taxes and congestion taxes under nationally agreed regimes covering these taxes. 
 
BOX 2.1: POSSIBLE WIDER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Any constitutional amendment process would be a major and lengthy event, and may or may not coincide with 
any future move to an Australian Republic. Whether or not we move to being a Republic, the head of state, not 
being the head of government, would presumably continue to have the vested powers of Executive Government, 
but to act, in the main, on the advice of his/her Ministers in Executive Council. Any constitutional revamping could 
usefully clarify the reserve powers of the head of state currently defined by convention. It is clear that the 
Governor-General has important reserve powers: namely, the power to appoint as Prime Minister the person 
whom the head of state concludes could most feasibly form government based on that person being able to 
command a majority in the House of Representatives, including in the circumstances of a hung Parliament; and 
the power to dismiss a Prime Minister where the House of Representatives has passed a no confidence motion 
against the Prime Minister. However, there are doubtful reserve powers where clarification would be helpful 
including the power to refuse a double dissolution; the power to withhold assent to (that is, veto) Bills passed by 
the Parliament; the power to select a new Prime Minster where the outgoing Prime Minister has resigned after 
defeat in the House of Representatives; and the power to dismiss a Prime Minister and effectively prorogue the 
Parliament and order fresh elections in the event of a political crisis such as a deadlock between the two Houses 
of Parliament. 
Parliament could also be reformed to run on a fixed term electoral basis. For instance, on a fixed day in 
November or December every third year, the entire House and half the Senate could go to the polls, thus giving 
Members of the House three full year terms and Senators six full year terms. Both the House and the Senate 
could then sit as immediately as practicable, and certainly before Christmas, after each election. This electoral 
reform would ensure that Parliaments run their full term (without running excessively long terms such as fixed four 
year terms) and the House and Senate terms would be synchronised. The fixed term arrangements would 
presumably have to contain flexibility provisions to accommodate the rare occasions where the head of state 
would be called upon to invoke reserve powers to prorogue the Parliament and order early elections. These 
provisions would probably need to adjust the length of the resulting fixed term of the subsequent Parliament so as 
to maintain the synchronicity between the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
 
It is proposed that, in order to adequately represent electors nationally where a two-tiered 
system is replacing the current three-tiered system, the House of Representatives be 
expanded from its current 150 members to 200 members. 
• The constitutional provisions that determine the number of electorates per State could 
be replaced with a new provision that the number of electorates in each city or regional 
area would be determined on a per capita basis, under a simple formula based on the 
actual number of members in the House allocated by the population shares of each city 
or regional area. In addition, the existing legislative provisions on the allowable variance 
for electorate sizes, of 10 per cent variation either side of the average size for that 
particular State, could also remain in place, but again be simplified to be 10 per cent of 
the average-sized electorate on a national not State basis. 
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• Increasing the House to 200 members would result in a reduction in the average 
electorate size from the current 93,970 electors per electorate to 70,440. This could 
facilitate additional legislative provisions that would require all city-based electorates to 
be contained within the five City Council boundaries. As well, the overwhelming majority 
of regional electorates could be required to be contained within Regional Council 
boundaries, but for a small minority where that might not be possible, there could be up 
to, say, a 25-30 per cent allowance for those electorates to spill over into a 
neighbouring region. 
• The Senate would also be increased in size from 76 to 110 Senators, so that the five 
Cities each have seven Senators, all large regions (over 500,000 people) have five 
Senators and the remaining small regions have three Senators. Senators would still 
serve six year terms, to be achieved by only half the cities and regions at a time going 
to each Federal election. If the NSW/WA/SA based cities and regions went in one cycle 
and the Vic/Qld/Tas/NT based cities and regions went in the other, the aggregate 
number of electors at each ‘half’ Senate election would be almost even. 
• With an increase in size of the House of Representatives to 200 members, and with 110 
Senators, the existing constitutional provisions that require the House to be, as nearly 
as practicable, twice the size of the Senate could be retained. 
CITIES AND REGIONS  
In moving to a cities and regional basis for a new Constitution, the aim would be to take 
advantage of the diversity of Australia as a nation continent while at the same time 
reinforcing and enhancing the flexibility, dynamism and competitive environment inherently 
built into the existing three-tiered Federation. There are various reasons for moving from our 
current three-tiered governance structure to a two-tiered structure, and for choosing the cities 
and regional level as the most appropriate point at which to condense State and local 
government into a single layer.  
• With responsibility for major policies shifting increasingly upwards to the Federal tier of 
government, a two-tiered governance structure would appear to be a sensible and 
feasible basis for allocating constitutional powers and setting up institutions, processes 
and incentives that best focus on the delivery of national programs and services directly 
to citizens and communities. 
• At the same time, city and regional government could effectively and efficiently take full 
responsibility for both policy and administration of urban, regional and local issues such 
as public transport, town planning and urban infrastructure, and community services. 
• It would recognise the demographic reality that the vast majority of Australians reside in 
our major cities, but with a sizeable minority living across the nation in a patchwork of 
diverse and vibrant regional communities of varying population and land area. 
• It would fully capture the decentralised elements that would keep in check concentrated 
power, and preserve choice, diversity and competition as vital elements of the 
Federation. 
• It would open up the opportunity to deliver significant efficiencies in public 
administration. 
Admittedly, the move to a two-tiered based constitutional model for the Federation would 
shift the balance of power further towards central government, but this would be 
counter-balanced by a delegation of authority to a new and consolidated second layer of 
government, thus empowering the cities and regions in a way that currently doesn’t exist. We 
need to address head-on the reality that constitutional powers are increasingly moving to 
Commonwealth control, with the development of greater tensions between the centre and the 
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lower levels of government, and the increasing faltering of many economic, social and 
environmental reforms necessary to safeguard the wellbeing of the Australian people. 
The five major cities — Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth — would be 
governed by single consolidated councils in each city. This would achieve a very long 
overdue reform where most cities are fractured by a myriad of local councils. At the same 
time, it would give the second tier of city government the wherewithal to deliver on the major 
city strategic plans as well as implementing major policies at the urban level. The five City 
Councils would cover around 13 ½ million (or 60 per cent of) residents and have extended 
boundaries to recognise current expanding conurbations and to allow for future expansion. 
Sydney would cover the whole of the greater Sydney basin (but not the Central Coast). 
Melbourne would extend to the area limits of current long term strategic planning. Brisbane 
would extend west to encompass Ipswich, Adelaide north to cover Gawler, and Perth south 
to cover Mandurah. 
The nineteen regions would bring together the commonalities of interest within regional 
areas, on which to base viable administrative and governance structures to deliver important 
national programs such as health and education networks as well as local infrastructure and 
utilities, community policing and emergency services, and town and regional planning. 
Commonality factors taken into account would include locational and geographic continuity, 
population settlement and social identity and cohesion, agricultural, resource and/or 
industrial base, transport and other infrastructure linkages, and environmental integrity. 
Given the historical and culture foundations of our Federation, the proposed Regional 
Council boundaries could be contained within the existing six State boundaries and the NT 
boundaries, except that the ACT would be subsumed into the surrounding Monaro Region of 
south-eastern NSW. Moreover, Albury-Wodonga and Coolangatta-Tweed are major existing 
population centres that straddle existing State boundaries, and they would each be combined 
and rolled into the proposed Riverina-Hume and Gold Coast regions respectively. The 
nineteen proposed Regional Councils would cover approximately 8 ½ million (or 40 per cent 
of) residents, with varying population sizes, as follows: 
• Large regions with major urban centres: Hunter (676,000), Monaro (569,000), Gold 
Coast (582,000), Burnett-Sunshine Coast (610,000), and Barwon-Grampians (598,000). 
• Medium sized regions based on major regional towns and industrial, resource and/or 
rural industries: Illawarra (431,000), Northern Rivers (485,000), Murray-Mallee 
(539,000), Cape York (531,000), Bowen-Whitsundays (406,000), and 
Derwent-Tamar-Mersey (503,000). 
• More traditional medium to smaller, rural-based, regions: New England-Macquarie 
(510,000), Riverina-Hume (325,000), Gippsland (262,000), Darling Downs (358,000), 
Riverlands-Central (437,000) and South West-Goldfields (356,000). 
• Small regions by population, but large in land area: the Northern Territory (226,000) and 
Kimberley-Pilbara-MidWest (148,000), that have much potential for the development of 
resources, tourism, agriculture and indigenous enterprises. 
The average population size in proposed regions in NSW would be 502,000, in Victoria 
482,000, in Queensland 484,000, in SA/NT 332,000, in WA 252,000 and in Tasmania 
503,000. Full details of the proposed Regional Councils are set out in Attachments B and C, 
and depicted in the map at Attachment D. 
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BOX 2.2: ACHIEVING AND IMPLEMENTING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
Achieving a major rewriting of the Constitution, along the lines of a two-tier based constitutional model as 
proposed in this paper, would no doubt be a difficult, and possibly protracted, task especially in garnering support 
and achieving consensus at various stages of the process. That task would be made all the harder, given the 
vested interests of the States and their historic, cultural and political heritage as founders of the Commonwealth 
in the first place, and given the central role they have played over the past 110 years in the development of 
Australia as a federated, democratic and modern sovereign nation. To be feasible and achievable, a sequenced 
process of constitutional reform could possibly involve: 
Step 1: Garnering support 
A new movement for constitutional reform could emerge through the advocacy of the intellectual and practical 
merits of a new two-tiered constitutional model by a coalition of constitutional academics; economic and political 
reform advocates; leading State figures disaffected by the breakdown of good State governance, and the 
consequential failure to deliver high quality outcomes in areas such as health and education; and various 
stakeholders seeking a new direction on urban and regional development that could connect strategic planning, 
transport and infrastructure, and urban development. 
Step 2: Constitutional Convention 
The main task during this phase would be to seek political support for a First Constitutional Convention that would 
meet over, say, a three month period, to redraft the constitution, followed by a six to twelve month period of 
detailed public consultation with stakeholders across the nation. This could then lead to a Second Constitutional 
Convention to finalise the new Constitution. 
Step 3: Referendum 
In this phase, constitutional convention leaders would need to lobby and negotiate actively with both sides of 
politics on the terms of the referendum to be put to the people. These leaders, together with ‘eminent persons’ 
and leading supporters from both sides of politics, could form a bipartisan coalition to prosecute the YES case for 
the subsequent referendum. The key, however, would be to rally the support of both the Prime Minister and 
Leader of the Opposition, as well as the State Premiers and other leaders, politicians and stakeholders, to 
actively support the YES case. Gaining such support would be difficult and may take some time and persuasion; 
however the support from such political leadership would be essential in achieving a YES vote at the referendum. 
Step 4: Implementation 
The transition to the new two tier governance system would likely take time and energy, and it could entail a 
phased implementation period over, say, 10 years. Central to the transition would be the reallocation of legal 
powers and the sorting out of a new judicial and legal framework, and the reworking of laws and regulations. 
Moreover, new City and Regional Councils would have to be elected, as well as Federal administration 
reorganised and streamlined; State bureaucracies dismantled; and city and regional administrative infrastructure 
and resourcing put in place. As well, the COAG, on advice from the Ministerial Council for Federal Financial 
Relations, made up of Federal, State and Territory Treasurers, would need to settle the details of the new city and 
regional fiscal and tax regimes necessary to underpin the new second tier of government, as provided for in the 
new Constitution. 
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COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS 
The new Constitution would also formally establish a revamped Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) made up of the Prime Minister, the five City Council Lord Mayors, 
and four representative Mayors of the Regional Councils (one each representing the NSW 
regions, combined Victorian/Tasmanian regions, Queensland regions, and combined 
WA/SA/NT regions). The COAG would serve as the main forum through which the design of 
national policy reform would be integrated with best practice program implementation and 
service delivery, and would be a fundamental institution for a united and consolidated 
Federation. Further details are set out in Chapter Four below. 
The COAG would analyse, debate and negotiate major areas of policy to implement 
significant economic, social and environmental reform. The COAG would also determine the 
most appropriate financing mechanisms and the optimal cost sharing between the two tiers 
of government. If agreed by the COAG, proposed reforms would be recommended to the 
Federal Parliament and, if ratified by both Houses of the Federal Parliament, with mirroring 
City and Regional Council legislation as required, the COAG reforms would be delivered, as 
agreed by the City and Regional Councils, across the nation. Further details are set out in 
Chapter Four below. 
NATIONAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
The current constitutional provisions in relation to the judiciary would need to be preserved 
under any revamped Constitution. Currently under the Constitution, the judicial powers of the 
Commonwealth are vested in the High Court and other Federal courts created by the Federal 
Parliament, or State courts vested with Federal jurisdiction by the Parliament. The High Court 
has original jurisdiction over various matters, including any matters conferred on it by the 
Parliament arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. As well, the High 
Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgements of any justice, or any Federal court or 
relevant State court, and judgements in such cases are final and conclusive. The current 
provisions that safeguard the independence of the High Court and Federal courts, relating 
specially to the appointment and dismissal of justices, would also need to be preserved. 
Upon abolition of the States, the revamped Constitution would create a relatively large 
number of City and Regional Councils with defined roles and responsibilities under powers 
specified under the two-tiered constitutional model. In these circumstances, it would probably 
be impractical to continue with separate Commonwealth, State and Territory judicial systems, 
thus necessitating an amalgamation of the existing judicial and legal system into one national 
system — high court, supreme courts, courts of appeal, specialist courts (for example, family 
law, planning & environment), district courts, and local magistrate courts. Significant 
administrative efficiencies are likely to be achieved by the amalgamation.  
A reconstituted Standing Committee of Attorneys-General would need to go through a 
lengthy and complex transitional exercise to allocate, consolidate and streamline the legal 
frameworks of the two layers of government in a harmonious and preferably uniform manner, 
with the documentation of a national criminal code and national civilian code, as well as the 
allocation and streamlining of property laws and other legislation and regulation. Most 
legislation would be enacted through the Federal Parliament, but the City and Regional 
Councils would need to have legislation covering areas of their own urban, regional and local 
issues, including property and water rights in designated urban areas. 
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Law enforcement, which mainly involves delivery of services at the local level, could retain a 
similar structure as now. This would mean the AFP retaining its national role including 
existing organised crime and national security responsibilities, with each city and region 
retaining its own police force. Small regions, however, should have the option of contracting 
out this function to a City or larger regional police force, or under contract to the AFP as 
currently occurs in the ACT. 
BOX 2.3: SATISFYING PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM 
The two-tiered constitutional model, as proposed in this paper, articulates a workable basis for a new Federation 
by seeking a balance between the principles of nationhood and cooperation, subsidiarity, structural efficiency, 
and accountability and fiscal equivalence. 
Nationhood and Cooperation: Under this principle, the new Federation would need to be constructed in a way 
that recognises that cooperation is fundamental to a well-functioning Federal system and that the national interest 
is paramount in achieving policies that build the nation. In this context, the model in this paper seeks to present a 
more realistic balancing of powers between the tiers of government, and adequate trade-offs between centralised 
and decentralised factors. Fundamental to this are proposed new constitutional provisions that would embed the 
structures and incentives for a more cohesive and workable Federation, including having clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities for the two tiers of government, and articulating the roles and objectives of the COAG, as the 
platform for linking the two layers of government for achieving significant reforms. 
Subsidiarity: Under this principle, responsibility for every function should reside with the lowest tier of 
government as practicable. In this sense, the model in this paper seeks initially to divide functions according to 
two principles of national strategic significance, and urban regional and local relevance, and then allocating 
various roles and responsibilities on a ‘functional’ basis, with the Federal tier concentrating on national policy and 
the city and regional tier tasked with determining local policies and delivering programs and services to citizens 
and communities. This is the basis of the application of the subsidiarity principle in deciding upon Federal, 
city/regional and shared powers under the proposed new Constitution. 
Structural Efficiency: Under this principle, the proposed Federal structure needs to address issues of flexibility 
and competitiveness within the Australian economy. In this regard, as set out below, this paper seeks to outline a 
model of a new Federal governance system that would embed a new set of institutions, processes and incentive 
structures that would present to Australia greatly enhanced opportunities for achieving significant economic, 
social and environmental reforms. Moreover, the model is structured in order to underpin the diversity, flexibility, 
dynamism and competitiveness of the revamped Federation. 
Accountability and Fiscal Equivalence: Under this principle, governments within the Federal structure need to 
remain accountable to the electorate and, in order to be held fully accountable, each tier of government should 
have an appropriate matching of its expenditure responsibilities and its revenue raising powers. As set out below, 
the model in this paper is soundly mindful of this principle, by proposing that the new Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations be implemented fully so that the Federal government desists from 
seeking to control inputs under federally funded programs and Cities and Regional Councils are given full 
autonomy, and are held accountable for delivering outcomes, under a robust performance monitoring system. 
Moreover, the new Councils would be supplied with new, enhanced and more stable sources of revenues that 
would give them the wherewithal to carry out their functions properly. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
In order to facilitate the move to a new Federation, this chapter sets out the framework that it 
would probably be necessary to build as an integral part of the constitutional reforms to 
ensure a credible and comprehensive macroeconomic architecture on which to base the new 
Federation. This would include negotiating an improved and widened framework for a 
national fiscal strategy encompassing both tiers of government, as well as significant reforms 
to the revenue sharing powers between the tiers of government along the lines of the 
recommendations from the recent Report on Australia’s Future Tax System. It would also be 
appropriate to reaffirm the role of monetary policy under the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
and financial sector supervision and regulation under the guidance of the Council of 
Australian Financial Regulators (CAFR). 
NATIONAL FISCAL STRATEGY  
Moving to a new constitutional model raises significant issues for fiscal strategy and 
underlying frameworks on a nationwide basis. Under the current Constitution, the second tier 
of government, that is, the States and Territories, are of limited number and most have 
balance sheets of substance. The ability for the States and Territories to handle fiscal risks 
both through the cycle and in the longer term is substantial. This is reflected in their credit 
ratings. On the other hand, under a new, two-tier based, constitutional model, the power 
structure would shift towards the Federal Government. The second tier of government, 
especially at the regional level, would be far more decentralised; would need to deliver best 
practice state-like services but from a city or regional administrative platform and 
infrastructure; and wouldn’t carry the underlying balance sheet strength of the current 
arrangements. 
Thus, any move to such a new constitutional model would probably need to be accompanied 
by a new national fiscal framework where the fiscal risks are mainly borne by the Federal 
Government, both in managing the economy through the cycle via the automatic stabilisers 
and discretionary measures, and in dealing with the longer term fiscal pressures. This 
means, in particular, dealing with demographic ageing and its effects on the national fiscal 
balance, and dealing significantly with health expenditures that are likely to continue to grow 
as a percentage of nominal GDP both as Australians grow richer and the ageing of the 
population progresses. The Federal Government would also need to cope more effectively 
with the growing importance and the increasing uncertainties of maintaining and enhancing 
the defence and national security capability, and with delivering overall efficiencies in 
defence and related expenditures. As well, the allocation of revenue sources under future tax 
reform would need to allocate to the Federal Government those sources that are particularly 
sensitive to the business cycle and to commodity prices, such as income and company 
taxes, and resource taxation (details explored below). 
In moving to a new city and regional constitutional federation, the framework for the national 
fiscal strategy could be required under the new Constitution, and be encapsulated in a 
revamped Charter of Budget Honesty, which would be legislated by, and applied to, both 
tiers of government. As now, the Charter of Budget Honesty would require the Federal 
Government to spell out its fiscal strategy with its annual Budget. The revamped Charter 
should continue to require that the strategy specify long term objectives within which 
shorter-term fiscal policy will be framed and based on principles of sound fiscal management. 
Such principles currently include: managing risks; ensuring fiscal policy contributes to 
achieving adequate national savings and to moderating cyclical fluctuations in economic 
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activity; pursuing spending and taxing policies that are consistent with a reasonable degree 
of predictability and stability of the tax burden; maintaining the integrity of the tax system; and 
ensuring there is regard to the financial effects on future generations. Importantly, the current 
provision should also be retained that requires specification of fiscal policy actions that are 
temporary in nature for the purpose of moderating the cycle as well as indicating the process 
for their reversal. The Charter could also include a principle that government intervention 
should only occur where government fiscal action is the most efficient instrument available 
compared with non-fiscal instruments and that this action would involve value for money. In 
addition, the Charter could require that medium to longer term scenarios be built into annual 
budget papers.  
Given the weakened balance sheet position of the proposed new second tier of government, 
it would be imperative that the revamped Charter also set out provisions for a disciplined set 
of fiscal rules for the City and Regional Councils that could require them, over the cycle, to 
deliver balanced budgets on an operating balance basis, that is, balance between revenues 
and operating expenditures (including depreciation). While borrowings to fund longer term 
infrastructure could be permissible, net worth in City and Regional Council balance sheets 
would need to be preserved taking into account intergenerational equity considerations. 
Moreover, each of these Councils should be required to have their own individual credit 
ratings and to borrow in their own name. Pragmatically, either the Australian Office of 
Financial Management or the existing State financial asset and debt management offices 
(reconstituted as jointly owned offices of the City and Regional Councils within their current 
State boundaries) could carry out the borrowing operations of each City and Regional 
Council concerned, on a fee for service basis.  
At least every three years, the Charter could require the Heads of Federal, City and Regional 
Treasuries to produce an independent Intergenerational Report, that would cover economic 
and fiscal sustainability, as an integrated package and on both a disaggregated and 
consolidated basis for the Federal and city/regional jurisdictions. The analysis should be 
required to look at projected fiscal gaps, and net debt and net worth analysis, over the 
following 40 years and to suggest possible medium to longer term corrective actions needed 
on problematic areas of expenditures and revenues, and/or medium to longer term reforms 
to increase potential growth to counter the fiscal gap through addressing population, 
participation and productivity issues. 
Under the Charter, various provisions that currently apply only to the Federal Government 
could also be required to be carried out by all of the City Councils, given their size and 
financial importance and their adequate resources to fulfil such provisions. This could include 
the provisions relating to publishing medium term fiscal strategies and pre-election material 
during caretaker periods (see Box 3.1 below). There would be no mandatory requirements 
for Regional Councils to also meet these provisions of the Charter, though they should have 
the option to do so if they so wished and were prepared to adequately resource such 
requirements. 
The details of any revamped Charter (and any subsequent amendments) would need to be 
agreed upon by the COAG and passed into law by the Federal Parliament, with harmonised 
enabling laws by the City and Regional Councils. 
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BOX 3.1: OPPORTUNITIES FOR GREATER FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Given the need to revamp the Charter of Budget Honesty to accommodate a targeted, more disciplined national 
fiscal framework to better suit the proposed new constitutional model, opportunities could also be taken in the 
process to revamp other areas of the fiscal landscape to enhance accountability, transparency and the fiscal 
policy debate. 
For example, during the caretaker period prior to each Federal election, Treasury and Finance should remain 
responsible for the independent production of the Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Outlook document. But it 
could be made mandatory for the Government and Opposition to submit their election commitments for 
independent costings by Treasury and Finance. Also, in advance of each election, protocols for election costings 
could be scrutinised and approved by the Auditor-General on behalf of the Federal Parliament, and the 
Auditor-General could report back to the Parliament post-election to verify the independence and effectiveness of 
the costings process. 
Moreover, the current Federal Parliament is moving towards the establishment of a Parliamentary Budget 
Office (PBO). The Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office has recommended that the PBO 
be established with a mandate to support and inform the Parliament by providing independent, non-partisan and 
policy neutral analysis on the annual Budget, government expenditure, fiscal policy and the financial implications 
of proposals. Its key functions would be to prepare responses to the requests of individual MPs and parliamentary 
committees, initiate its own work in anticipation of the interests of the Parliament, and prepare costings of election 
commitments of both major and minor parties and independent members that they may request during the 
election caretaker period. The PBO would be able to access information under MOUs with Treasury, Finance and 
other relevant departments. It wouldn’t, however, be required to produce its own fiscal forecasts or projections, 
given their resource intensity and the need to minimise duplication of work produced elsewhere. The 
Parliamentary Budget Officer would be established as an independent officer of the Parliament similar to the 
Auditor-General, with the PBO being provided with staff comparable in attributes to those in the Treasury, 
Finance and the Productivity Commission. 
To be effective, the proposed PBO would need to be well resourced and should be available particularly to the 
Opposition, minor parties and independents, to undertake fiscal policy analysis and costings independently of the 
Treasury and Finance Departments. Moreover, during the caretaker period, the PBO could also provide 
verification of Treasury/Finance election commitment costings where requested by the relevant party. 
The Charter should continue to be based on international accounting standards as set out under the IMF 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS). A well-resourced and independent Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) should continue to be the standard setter and adjudicator of the GFS here in Australia. The ABS would 
also need to continue at world’s best practice to ensure that policy design and implementation in this country 
remains underpinned by reliable and timely economic, social and environmental statistics. 
 
REVENUE RAISING POWERS UNDER TAX REFORM 
The new Federal Constitution would also set out clearly the division of revenue raising 
powers between the two tiers of government. The negotiations of the new Constitution could 
include a series of Tax Summits to seek agreement on the major tax reforms.  
Importantly, tax reform is an ongoing task and, in this context, the recommendations of the 
recent Henry review (2009) on Australia’s Future Tax System (AFTS) could be viewed as 
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just one set of reform proposals in that ongoing task. However, the AFTS report is far more 
significant than that. Indeed, the AFTS recommendations set out a visionary blueprint for a 
tax and transfer system for Australia to meet the challenges and opportunities that the nation 
will likely face for the 21st century. Integral to all broad themes of the AFTS reforms are 
proposals for a more efficient, accountable and transparent delineation of roles and 
responsibilities between the various tiers of government in the Federation. 
In sorting out a new Constitution, the proposed series of Tax Summits would therefore need 
to take an integrated approach that sought not just to achieve substantial tax reform but also 
to agree on the assignment of appropriately matched revenue raising powers under the new 
Constitution. 
Under the proposed Tax Summits, it could be envisaged that revenue raising powers under 
the new Constitution would result in Federal taxes being based on income and company tax, 
capital gains tax, customs and excise, and a comprehensive resource rent tax applying to all 
offshore and onshore petroleum and mineral operations, but with existing State royalties 
abolished. Thus, revenue risks through the business and commodity price cycles would be 
mainly carried at the Federal level. Cities and regional taxes could be based on a broad 
based consumption tax that utilises appropriate technology to properly capture private final 
consumption without bringing business-to-business transactions into the tax net. Such a tax 
could deliver significant efficiencies and cost saving for governments, businesses and 
citizens as it could replace the administratively cumbersome GST as well as many inefficient 
State taxes. As well, land taxes could replace both existing State stamp duties and general 
local council rates, and congestion charges should be introduced in the major cities. 
An overarching objective of tax reform should be to seek a significant reduction in the vertical 
fiscal imbalances (VFI) embedded in the current constitutional arrangements. Such a 
reduction in VFI would have the positive effect of building in incentives for City and Regional 
Councils to embrace reforms that enhance economic growth and thus increase their own 
source revenues (without having to negotiate with the Federal Government to share in such 
revenue growth dividends a majority of which currently accrue to the Federal Budget). 
As set out above, the Federal Government would have direct constitutional power for raising 
personal and business taxes, customs and excise duties, and resource taxes. City and 
Regional Councils would be constitutionally empowered to raise consumption taxes and land 
taxes but it is proposed that they would come under nationally agreed regimes covering 
these taxes. City and regional taxes (and any subsequent amendments) could be designed 
on a nationwide basis by the Council of Financial Ministers (comprised of Federal, City and 
Regional Treasurers). The Constitution could require that such tax regimes would need to be 
agreed upon by the COAG and legislated by the City and Regional Councils as agreed. This 
would maximise the possibility that the tax design, particularly the scope and tax base, would 
conform to best practice as agreed in the Tax Summits, have a certain degree of national 
uniformity and avoid the ongoing undermining of the bases of efficient taxes as currently 
happens at the State level. Fiscal efficiencies generated by certain jurisdictions could still 
enable them to set more ‘competitive’ taxing regimes than other jurisdictions as they should 
still remain free to set their own rate of the tax. 
City and Regional Councils should apply user charges to all municipal services as happens 
currently but reformed to cover all fixed and variable costs and depreciation of underlying 
infrastructure. City Councils could introduce congestion charges to the five major cities. In 
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addition, road charges should be introduced for all vehicles across the nation by the Federal 
Government using the latest GPS tracking technology. 
BOX 3.2: MAJOR REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE HENRY REVIEW 
The AFTS recommendations represent a comprehensive and visionary set of tax reform proposals organised 
around the following nine broad themes: 
1. Revenue raising would be concentrated on four robust and efficient tax bases, namely, personal income, 
business income, private consumption and economic rents from natural resources and land. Inefficient 
taxes including property transfer taxes, payroll tax and resource royalties would be abolished. 
2. The tax and transfer architecture would be redesigned to promote higher participation and productivity, 
including empowering higher private investment and capital deepening. Proposals could include clear 
work incentives in transfer payments, lower company tax, (but noting that a business-level expenditure 
tax could suit Australia in the future), enhanced capital allowances, a common discount for interest, net 
residential rents and capital gains, and greater use of road user and congestion charges. 
3. An equitable, transparent and simplified personal income tax system, and the use of 21st century 
technologies to make the system fairer, easier to comply with and more robust. 
4. A work supportive transfer system with three levels of primary support — pensions for the aged, 
disabled and carers; lower-rated participation allowances for those of working age; and assistance 
payments for young people and students — each with means tests and withdrawal rates reflecting 
different work expectations. 
5. Integration of consumption tax compliance with business systems, including replacing the current narrow 
State tax bases (including a redundant payroll tax) with a low-rate, broad cash flow tax that more 
effectively utilises the consumption base, and is based on automated business systems.  
6. Introduction of efficient resource and land taxation, with existing royalties replaced by a uniform resource 
rent tax and existing stamp duties on land transfers replaced by land tax. 
7. Completion of retirement income reform and aged care security including a proposal for the current tax 
on superannuation contributions to be abolished and all contributions to attract a uniform percentage tax 
offset payable to contributors. 
8. Progression towards more affordable housing, through changes to the tax and transfer system to 
complement any policy changes to better match aggregate housing supply and demand. Changes could 
include a substantial increase in the maximum rate of Rent Assistance and replacing public housing rent 
concessions with Rent Assistance, to improve equity and work incentives; replacing land transfer taxes 
with a land tax applying to all land whether owner-occupied or investor owned; and a 40 per cent 
discount on all net residential rental income, losses and capital gains for a more neutral personal tax 
treatment of residential investments. 
9. A more open, understandable and responsive tax system, with citizens able to access comprehensive 
and timely information on their tax and transfer affairs, and be able to interpret how their tax and transfer 
outcomes have arisen and how they may affect them. Also recommended was an enhanced role for the 
Board of Taxation, as well as ensuring that the Inspector-General of Taxation, the Auditor-General and 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman, would be sufficiently resourced. As well, it was recommended that 
there be a new Board to advise the Commissioner of Taxation on the general organisation and 
management of the Australian Taxation Office. 
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The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and the existing State and Territory Revenue Offices 
would be merged to form a single entity to deliver tax administration on behalf of both tiers of 
government in accordance with the new constitutional provisions, on a fee for service basis. 
This reform would offer the prospect of significant administrative efficiencies and cost 
savings. The ATO would be held accountable for its performance by the Council of Financial 
Ministers which would report to the Federal Parliament and the City and Regional Councils 
on the ATO’s efficiency, transparency and responsiveness to legitimate stakeholder 
concerns.  
FEDERAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS 
Future financial relations between the Federal Government and the City and Regional 
Councils could be governed by an expanded version of the recently introduced 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) on Federal Financial Relations. This agreement 
represents a landmark reform that has simplified the system, laid down a clearer 
specification of roles and responsibilities between each level of government, introduced 
centralised Treasury-to-Treasury payment arrangements, and sets out the ambition to 
transition to an ‘outcomes’ basis for performance monitoring. The main issues for 
transitioning the IGA to a new two-tier based constitutional model would revolve around 
implementation, such as how to expand the payment system in a secure and reliable way 
from the current 8 to the proposed 24 recipient Treasuries, and how to ensure that 
performance indicator data can be properly collected, collated and analysed on a city and 
regional basis. 
Under the new constitutional model, issues of equity would be emphasised given the high 
degree of economic and social diversity and disparity that would become patently clear 
between the various city and regional areas. To address such equity issues, it would be 
fundamentally important to deliver to all the new Councils adequate revenue raising powers 
as outlined above to enable them to do their job properly. In addition, horizontal fiscal 
equalisation (HFE) principles would need to be preserved although they could be made 
simpler, as well as more efficient, transparent and fairer as between donor and recipient 
jurisdictions than under the current Grants Commission processes. Current processes are 
being reviewed by a Panel appointed by the Federal Government taking into account the 
principles of efficiency, equity, simplicity, predictability and stability. The Panel is due to 
present its final report by September 2012. A major issue for resolution is how to address the 
problem that, under the present system, States can be penalised for economic growth and 
rewarded for economic underperformance, whereas the processes should be encouraging 
economic reform and better delivery of services. 
Under a new constitutional model for the Federation, the proposed new cash flow 
consumption tax collected by the ATO on behalf of the cities and regions could be distributed 
on the basis of a much simplified formula, taking into account a limited number of variables 
for determining revenue raising capacity and expenditure needs for each city/region. 
Revenue variables could be limited to population, incomes and land values. Expenditure 
variables could be limited to population ageing and indigenous demographics, income 
distribution, urbanisation and land mass per capita. The Grants Commission could be 
downsized to a division of the Productivity Commission (PC) to undertake five yearly updates 
of the HFE formula and to determine annual distributions to the cities and regions. This 
proposal would deliver administrative savings at both levels of government.  
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A major issue for resource rich States is that significant portions of their increased revenues 
from mining royalties are effectively being redistributed to other (non-resource rich) States 
under current HFE processes. Resource rich States see this as an unfair redistribution of 
their new revenue wealth and that they are being asked to carry an unfair and 
disproportionate burden of supporting the recipient States. However, non-resource rich 
States equally see this as an equitable outcome of the HFE processes in ensuring that all 
jurisdictions within the Federation have equal capacity and opportunities to provide 
infrastructure and services to their citizens. 
Under the proposed new Federation model, this issue could be substantially resolved, 
though it would still require careful negotiations for the transition to a new federal system by 
the Federal Government. As set out in Chapter Four below, under the new Federation all 
responsibilities for resource development would transfer to the Federal Government and all 
royalties would be abolished and be replaced by a comprehensive resources rent tax. 
Moreover, all City and Regional Councils would be provided with enhanced and possibly 
new, more efficient and predictable revenue sources which would give them all adequate and 
equal capacity and opportunities to supply infrastructure and services to their citizens. From 
a pragmatic political view, however, there would probably need to be negotiated transitional 
compensation to the resource rich cities and regions for the loss of royalty income, and 
appropriate mechanisms for ensuring that infrastructure to support and enhance the 
resources sector is provided on an efficient, ongoing basis into the future. Over the longer 
term, the issues could be ‘internalised’ federally, through the new tax system and by the 
efficient delivery of infrastructure funding by the Federal Government to support resources 
development on a national basis. 
BOX 3.3: INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT (IGA) ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS 
The main features of the new IGA that was agreed upon by the COAG in November 2008 and came into 
operation on 1 January 2009, are as follows: 
• A significant, landmark reform covering general purpose payments (GPPs) funded mainly by the GST, 
National Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) and National Partnership (NP) payments, and with clearer 
specification of the roles and responsibilities, and the accountabilities, of each level of government. 
• SPPs have been reduced in number from 90 to 5, with six associated National Agreements having been 
agreed by the COAG on healthcare, education, skills and workforce participation, disabilities, housing 
affordability and indigenous reform. 
• NP payments have been introduced as a new form of payment to fund specific projects and to reward 
jurisdictions that deliver on nationally significant reforms. 
• Performance of all governments will require them to achieve mutually-agreed ‘outcomes and performance 
benchmarks’ specified in each National Agreement, and will be assessed by the independent COAG 
Reform Council (CRC) and reported publicly on an annual basis. 
• The Productivity Commission will also be reporting back to the COAG every two to three years on the 
economic impact and benefits of the IGA reforms. 
 
MONETARY STABILITY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION  
Monetary policy, as the main demand management tool for the national economy, would 
remain the responsibility of the RBA. The Reserve Bank Act 1959 makes provision for 
achieving the RBA’s dual mandate to preserve price stability, and to keep the economy 
growing as closely as possible to potential, and to full employment (in the context of a freely 
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floating exchange rate regime). As currently happens, parameter targets for achieving price 
stability through the cycle would be set out periodically in a memorandum of understanding 
between the Federal Treasurer and the RBA Governor. The independence of the RBA would 
need to be preserved as a foundation for maintaining policy credibility, subject to the current 
provisions in the RBA Act that enables the Governor-General on advice of the Federal 
Executive Council to determine the policy to be adopted by the Bank on the rare occasions of 
a dispute between the Government and the Bank over the stance of policy, and for a 
statement of this determination to be tabled in both Houses of the Federal Parliament. RBA 
accountability would continue to dictate that the Bank makes public its reasons for its policy 
decisions, as well as publishing RBA Board minutes. In addition, it would continue to publish 
regular statements on monetary policy, and the Governor should continue to appear twice a 
year before the relevant economic committee of the Federal Parliament. 
Given financial stability is fundamental to the sustainability of the overall economy, financial 
market regulation would be retained within the existing regulatory framework at the Federal 
level, with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) responsible for prudential 
regulation, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) responsible for 
market supervision and investor conduct, and the RBA responsible for the overall stability of 
the financial system and operation of the payment system, and as the lender of last resort to 
financial markets in the event of financial crises. An increasingly important role will probably 
continue to emerge for the Council of Australian Financial Regulators (CAFR) made up of 
the heads of the RBA, APRA, ASIC and the Federal Treasury. The role of the CAFR is to 
contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of financial regulation by providing a forum for 
co-operation and collaboration amongst its members. Its members are able to share 
information and views, discuss regulatory reforms or issues where responsibilities overlap 
and, if the need arises, co-ordinate responses to potential threats to financial stability. The 
Council also has a role in advising the Federal Government on the adequacy of Australia’s 
financial system architecture in light of ongoing developments. In the future, functions of the 
CAFR will probably need to continue to expand in the areas of regulatory co-ordination and 
the application of the Basel III principles to Australian institutions, as well as areas of policy 
design on major issues such as banking stability, financial sector competition and deposit 
insurance, and the stance that Australia should be taking at international negotiations, 
especially at G20, on the international financial regulatory framework. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MICROECONOMIC REFORM 
This Chapter makes proposals for the structure, roles and responsibilities, and incentives 
that could be conducive to attaining an ambitious microeconomic reform agenda across the 
spectrum of structural policy issues. As such, the Chapter seeks to make the case for 
constitutional reform and a new Federal governance system on the basis that such changes 
would present Australia with enhanced opportunities for achieving the sorts of economic, 
social and environmental reforms necessary to maintain and enhance our place in a rapidly 
changing and globalising world.  
The Chapter sets out detailed discussion of the various areas of major national policy 
concern, where the powers between the two tiers of government would need to be redefined 
or clarified as part of the constitutional reform process. In doing so, it is argued in the 
Chapter that: 
1 the redefinition and clarification of various powers between the two tiers of 
government would of itself result in major reforms. The act of abolition of the States, 
and the reassignment of their powers, is central to this process. Examples here relate 
to resources development, national energy and water reform, land transport, and city 
and town planning; 
2 the defining of various powers for allocation between the two tiers of government on a 
functional basis (that is, between national policy frameworks and service delivery to 
local communities) would facilitate the opportunity for the full implementation of some 
major areas of reform, particularly in health and education; and 
3 the new structures and incentives built into the constitutional framework for the new 
Federation, including through the enhanced COAG model, would greatly improve the 
chances of achieving major reforms, right across the whole policy spectrum, and be 
fundamental to the ongoing process of reform that would endure on a longer term 
basis.  
STALLING OF THE REFORM AGENDA 
The COAG is the main Commonwealth-State mechanism for seeking co-operative solutions 
to difficult national issues that require a national outcome, but involve many State 
responsibilities under the current constitutional arrangements within the Federation. The 
problem is that it is proving increasingly difficult to achieve transformational and timely 
reforms. The COAG is currently dealing with a range of difficult and complex issues involving 
social, economic and environmental dimensions including health and hospitals, disability 
care and support, business deregulation for a seamless national economy, national energy 
and water reforms, climate change and energy efficiency, environmental regulation, 
homelessness and indigenous disadvantage.  
The problem is that the Federation was born at a time when we had six colonies and six 
markets. The founding fathers’ objective was to have a cohesive Federation, but divisive 
arguments were had between protectionists who wanted to preserve the six markets and free 
trade federationists who wanted a common market Federation. So the constitutional 
provisions to achieve a common market were probably too weak, put few obligations on the 
States and for some time were narrowly interpreted. However, particularly over recent 
decades, there have been significant advances in economic reforms that have progressed us 
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towards a single market, although much work still needs to be done. Often reforms have 
been accompanied by an accelerated use of Commonwealth powers, including the external, 
corporations, trade and commerce, industrial disputation, taxation, and customs and excise 
powers, that have increasingly encroached on traditional areas of States’ rights. The 
outcome has been that, under current arrangements, States’ rights and parochial political 
interests have often clashed at the COAG with those purporting to seek national objectives 
and the meeting of international obligations. In most instances, there remains a fine, but 
fragile, balance in the sharing of powers. While the Commonwealth has the advantage of 
revenue raising powers and financial strength, and has financed much of the encroachment 
on what was previously an exclusive State domain, the States ultimately hold the 
constitutional powers that are necessary to achieve most reforms in the national interest.  
ROLE OF THE COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS 
A revamped Constitution on a city and regional basis, would bring a fresh start to how we 
address important economic, social and environmental reforms in the national interest. 
Admittedly, under this new, federated structure, power would shift further to the Federal 
Government. With a less balanced power sharing, there would be a need for a fundamental 
institution in which the two tiers of government could come together to forge a partnership 
between policy design and legislation (Federal responsibility), and the consequential delivery 
of programs and services flowing from those policy reforms (city/regional responsibility). 
As stated above, the COAG could appropriately serve as the vehicle for achieving a wide 
ranging reform agenda on a consensual basis, and would thus be a fundamental institution 
for a united and consolidated federation. The COAG would analyse, debate and negotiate 
major areas of policy to implement significant reforms and would determine the most 
appropriate financing mechanisms and the optimal cost sharing between the two tiers of 
government. Unlike the current COAG, it would have legal standing as provided for under the 
new Constitution, and reform packages agreed by the COAG and passed into law by the 
Federal Parliament, and City and Regional Councils as required, would be implemented and 
delivered nationwide. 
Institutional arrangements that currently support the COAG should be retained. In particular, 
the CRC should continue to play its pivotal role of monitoring and reporting on the 
implementation of the COAG reform agenda. Such reporting should be made directly and 
transparently to the Federal Parliament and the City and Regional Councils, and the CRC 
should appear before an appropriate parliamentary committee at least once a year, similar to 
the RBA arrangements. 
In addition, the COAG should have its own secretariat adequately resourced to carry out 
policy analysis support, as well as administrative support and co-ordination for the COAG. 
Overall reporting on the whole gambit of reform, and the undertaking of extensive, public and 
transparent inquiries into specific reform proposals, should continue to be carried out by the 
Productivity Commission (PC). However, the PC is now increasingly expected to cover areas 
of reform far removed from the more traditional microeconomic reform agenda. This involves 
public sector, rather than private sector, issues covering social policy and its delivery and/or 
issues of environmental protection. Much of the debate involves the interface and trade-offs 
between economic, social and environmental sustainability. Accordingly, the PC charter 
should be strengthened and clarified to reflect these points. 
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Every three years, interspersed with the proposed release by the Federal and City and 
Regional Council Treasuries of the Intergenerational Report that focuses on economic and 
fiscal sustainability, the PC could be required to release its own independent and 
complementary report that would focus on social and environmental sustainability over the 
next 40 years, and its interface with the likely evolutionary trajectory of the economy. 
 
BOX 4.1: COAG REFORM COUNCIL PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE COAG 
On 9 February 2011, in a speech to CEDA in Sydney, chairman of the COAG Reform Council (CRC), Paul 
McClintock, pointed out the growing importance of the COAG as one of the premier executive governance 
structures in Australian public life, with raised expectations concerning the COAG despite its lack of a 
constitutional basis. He also noted that the national issues before the COAG have a Federal dimension of 
growing importance, and that nearly all the tough decisions require a significant level of Federal co-operation. He 
also pointed out that the main purpose of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations, as agreed to by the COAG, was 
to bring to each sphere of government clear roles and responsibilities to deliver national reforms and to improve 
accountability of all governments. Mr McClintock then outlined five specific points to strengthen and reform the 
COAG, as follows: 
• With the current influx of new membership to the COAG forum, leaders should state whether they are 
committed to the COAG reform agenda and its new style of governance under the IGA framework. A 
reaffirmation of the agenda and its key governance features of clear roles and responsibilities matched by 
strong accountability and transparency is required if the reform agenda is to be implemented effectively. 
• There needs to be a considerably greater political investment by all the COAG governments to sell the new 
system of roles and accountabilities, and that not enough is being done by leaders and key Ministers to 
promote the agenda and the new governance approach. 
• There is a need for a greater commitment to effective and timely accountability and that the IGA approach 
depends crucially on the development of robust performance indicators and benchmarks. 
• There should be a review of the COAG’s structures and operations, which are currently based on its 
original role of an occasional summit meeting with no set meeting timetable, an agenda set by the 
Commonwealth, and no permanent resources to support the COAG. 
• There needs to be an emphasis on sorting out who is responsible for what and who is leading on each 
process. With significant vertical fiscal imbalance, the government who collects the taxes now expects to 
be the one who makes all the calls, as distinct from the level of government with the skills to realistically do 
the job, bringing an inevitable confusion on accountability. 
At its subsequent meeting on 13 February 2011, the COAG adopted a streamlined agenda built around five 
themes of strategic importance at the intersection of jurisdictional responsibilities, namely: 
• a long term strategy for economic and social participation; 
• a national economy driven by our competitive advantages; 
• a more sustainable and liveable Australia; 
• better health services and a more sustainable health system; and 
• closing the gap on indigenous disadvantage. 
The COAG also renewed its commitment to strong ongoing monitoring and reporting of important initiatives, and 
to prioritising the passage of legislation to give effect to agreements reached by the COAG. The COAG has also 
set ambitious goals to improve outcomes with the review of the performance frameworks of National Agreements 
providing an opportunity to ensure that progress is measured and that all jurisdictions are clearly accountable to 
the public and the COAG. 
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BUILDING A DIVERSE AND COMPETITIVE FEDERATION 
A great strength of Australia being a nation-continent is the demographic, social, economic, 
geographic and environmental diversity right across the country. Moving to a cities and 
regional approach for a new Constitution would aim to take advantage of that strength. Under 
a two tier based constitutional model, the balance of power would shift further towards 
central government. However, counter-balancing this would be a delegation of authority to a 
new and consolidated second layer of government, that would empower communities in the 
cities and regions in a way that currently doesn’t exist. 
Under a new constitutional model, cities and regions would have clearly defined 
responsibilities, and accompanying financial and taxation resources, to deliver programs and 
services to their communities, effectively and efficiently, and without the dead hand of 
bloated State bureaucracies. This, of itself, would facilitate the opportunity to deliver on some 
major areas of reform, particularly in health and education, and finally to consolidate strategic 
planning, the provision of urban infrastructure and public transport, and urban design and 
development, within a single jurisdictional layer. 
While the shift of power could increase the suspicions that may exist towards the central 
government, equally cities and regions are currently much disadvantaged under State 
Governments that have poorly delivered on outcomes in health, education, public transport, 
and urban and regional development. 
With the COAG as the forum for advancing much of the future reform initiatives, it could be 
argued that its proposed larger, and more diverse, membership would make governance of 
the country more difficult. On the other hand, it could equally be argued that policy design 
and formulation by the re-constituted COAG would be greatly enhanced by feedback from 
cities and regions about what can be practically and efficiently delivered at the local level. 
This important feedback loop would arise because the revamped constitutional arrangements 
would aim to assign the task of program and service delivery to that layer of government 
judged best suited to undertake the task. 
It could also be argued that greater centralisation of powers, and the development of 
harmonised reforms through the COAG would undermine the flexibility, dynamism and 
competitive environment that exists under the current three-tiered Federation. However, such 
strengths need not be lost under the two tier based Constitutional model and, indeed, may 
well be enhanced. The PC has pointed out that competition between jurisdictions is driven by 
underlying factors such as transport and energy costs, infrastructure quality and reliability, 
regulatory requirements, workforce skills, proximity to markets, and political and social 
stability. Most of these factors can be positively influenced by jurisdictions providing good 
governance, and best practice program and service delivery — major objectives of moving 
from a three-tiered to a two-tiered constitutional system. 
In addition to the above factors, diversity flexibility and competition between jurisdictions can 
be influenced by differing tax regimes. While the tax reforms proposed under the new 
Federation would be delivered via nationally agreed tax regimes by the City and Regional 
Councils, each jurisdiction would remain free, as noted in Chapter Three above, to choose 
their own tax rates — reflective of their underlying fiscal efficiencies and their choice of the 
size of government within their jurisdictions. 
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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SUSTAINABLE POPULATION 
Moving forward into the 21st century, Australia’s economy will likely be driven by four 
important forces namely: 
• An ageing but growing population. 
• An emerging Asian economic power block, particularly China and India. 
• Environmental constraints dominated by climate change. 
• Significant technological changes driven by the ICT revolution. 
To some extent these four forces are inter-related. For instance, while our population would 
be ageing and fiscal pressures from health care rising, the economic forces from Asia are 
likely to translate into strong growth in our economy with demand for skilled labour dictating a 
strongly growing workforce and population. As projected in the 2010 Intergenerational 
Report, on present trends of fertility, life expectancy and net overseas migration of around 
180,000 pa, Australia is likely to reach a population of around 36 million by 2050. 
The Government has recently released the first sustainable population strategy. The 
objective here should be not to set artificial targets for population growth, because factors 
such as economic growth and productivity performance are likely to influence significantly 
such population outcomes in the longer run. The objective of any sensible population 
strategy should be to set in place the kind of policies that will deliver the education, health, 
urban infrastructure and public transport, urban design and amenity, and regional 
development that would accommodate such economic and population growth in a manner 
that preserves social cohesion and environmental sustainability. Moreover, the demand for 
our resources particularly from Asia is unleashing a fundamental restructuring of the 
Australian economy towards resource development. Population growth and increased 
workforce participation would assist in that adjustment process by increasing the supply of 
skilled labour available for bidding by other trade-exposed industries such as manufacturing, 
tourism and education services, in competition with the rapidly growing resources sector. 
Clearly, population strategy is such a significant national issue that, under the proposed new 
Federation, it should remain a Federal responsibility guided by the release of the 
Intergenerational Report and the proposed PC report on social and environmental 
sustainability. As stated above, the strategy should be based on an overall policy mix of 
optimising economic growth against social cohesion and environmental sustainability. The 
COAG should have responsibility for co-ordinating the provision of infrastructure and 
community amenity on both a city and regional basis, consistent with achieving the 
population strategy. Importantly, policies on strategic planning, infrastructure provision, and 
markets in energy, communications, water and carbon would play a central role in achieving 
a sustainable basis for the population strategy. 
Immigration policy could appropriately be based on the two-tiered Federal constitutional 
model where policy, legislation and visa processing would remain determined at the Federal 
level, but program delivery especially of settlement and associated community services for 
newly arrived migrants could be delegated as a responsibility of City and Regional Councils. 
Immigration policy should be couched in a medium term framework guided by the population 
strategy relating to economic growth, social cohesion and environmental sustainability. 
Moreover, the PC could be tasked with advising the Federal Government publicly on the 
likely shorter term immigration demand and supply factors and their consequences for 
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sustainability, to assist the Government in determining the annual net migration intake as 
announced in each year’s Federal budget. 
WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION AND WELFARE TO WORK REFORM 
Demographic ageing and fiscal pressures, and the rapidly emerging resources sector, clearly 
determine that a high priority should be placed on policies for increasing work force 
participation and reducing welfare dependency. There is reasonable bipartisanship on this 
issue but not necessarily on the means and degree of reform needed. 
OECD analysis indicates that Australia’s participation rate is above the OECD average but 
we still lag behind the best performers: Denmark, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden 
and Canada. Moreover, underutilised labour (that is, the unemployed, the underemployed 
that would like to work more hours, and workers only marginally attached to the labour force) 
is above the OECD average. The most important underutilised groups are women especially 
those with children, lone parents, people with disabilities, older workers, people with low 
education attainment and the indigenous population. People with disabilities, lone parents 
and indigenous Australians face particularly weak labour market engagement which raises 
the risk of social exclusion. OECD analysis indicates a close link between social exclusion 
and labour underutilisation and has recommended a strategy for Australia focussing on 
individual needs, including an education system that better promotes equity and an 
integrated community service approach to people with disabilities and the homeless.  
The 2005 Welfare to Work reforms introduced by the Howard Government have now been 
supplemented by the Building Australia’s Future Workforce package introduced by the 
current Government in the 2011-12 Budget. These reform packages have focussed on four 
main recipient groups, namely jobless parents, disability support recipients, mature aged 
unemployed and the long term unemployed, and have sought to improve rewards from 
working via the tax/transfer system, tightened eligibility and work test requirements, and 
enhanced training and other support to improve connectivity with the labour market. In the 
recent Building Australia’s Future Workforce package, measures also included a new intense 
approach that seeks to address geographical disadvantage in an attempt to break the cycle 
of entrenched and ongoing labour force disconnection in ten selected areas. The measures 
are aimed particularly at jobless families and teenage parents. 
There are significant areas of policy that are mainly Federal responsibilities that influence 
labour force participation with the main issues focussing on labour market flexibility, the tax 
and transfer system, eligibility requirements for income support, and job network delivery 
mechanisms. Skills formation and a well-functioning education system would also need to be 
a high priority for both Federal and city and regional governments. 
One important issue that will become an increasing imperative to be addressed by the 
Federal Government would be to progressively rebalance the tax and transfer system 
towards a predominant emphasis on welfare to work objectives, thus undoing much of the 
focus of the current tax and transfer interface on delivering middle class welfare. 
Again, the proposed two-tiered constitutional model for the new Federation would appear to 
be an appropriate way forward for enhancing welfare to work reform, determining that policy 
responsibilities, income support systems and disability insurance would rest with the Federal 
Government, but that the delivery of services, particularly for skills formation and community 
and family support services, would rest with the City and Regional Councils. Over time, 
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consideration could also be given to transferring Centrelink’s regional network and related 
services from the Federal jurisdiction to the city and regional governments for co-ordination 
with their existing community and family support services. 
HEALTH REFORM  
The current health system is a patchwork of overlapping responsibilities between the 
Commonwealth and the States and Territories, poor accountability and incentives for best 
practice and cost minimisation, lack of cohesion between hospitals and primary health care, 
barriers between public and private sectors, and a mismatch between funding and 
administrative responsibility. The direction of current reforms is aimed at addressing some of 
these weaknesses, through having more decentralised networking, integration of services, 
scrutiny of output pricing, and more reliable avenues of financing. Health reform is also 
fundamental to addressing the longer term fiscal gap by containing health expenditures. 
The move to a revamped Federation could be particularly instrumental in finally sorting out 
the health system issues, and enhancing the prospects for a well-functioning system of 
networks on a city and regional basis. Federal responsibility could focus on policy design, 
insurance, pharmaceutical benefits and the funding arrangements for the growing health 
expenditure gap. Cities and regions could focus on service delivery through proposed new 
integrated service networks. One possible approach that could be negotiated through the 
COAG would be as follows: 
• There would be an overarching objective for the reforms that would seek to deliver 
hospital and primary health care services on an integrated basis and with truly 
independent local networks free of outside bureaucratic interference (uch bureaucratic 
interference still remains a major risk to the achievement of the National Health 
Reforms as recently agreed to by the COAG). 
• There could be around 40 networks of integrated, public and private hospitals and 
primary health care and aged care facilities. There could be between three and six 
networks in each major city and at least one network in each region. State 
bureaucracies could be abolished and each network governed by an independent 
board, directly responsible to the relevant city or regional Health Minister.  
• Health services would be provided on a fee for service or co-payment basis, including 
public hospitals, with a safety net for those who couldn’t afford the relevant fee or 
co-payment.  
• The Federal Government would remain responsible for Medicare insurance and the 
private insurance market, the delivery of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, and full 
funding responsibility for aged care.  
• Funding would be provided to the networks as shared between federally supplied SPPs 
and city and regional taxation. The Medicare Levy could be abolished. Above base 
funding, the Federal Government could guarantee to supply any annual growth in 
funding of the networks beyond the growth in nominal GDP as well as underpinning the 
funding of Medicare. The health insurance rebate could also be abolished.  
• In return for these growth funding guarantees, the health networks would be subjected 
to the scrutiny of a newly created national health services regulator that would 
determine the price at which government financial payments would be made to each 
network for the integrated services provided. 
28 
 
 
BOX 4.2: THE COAG DEAL ON HEALTH REFORM  
On 13 February 2011, the COAG agreed on national health reforms to secure the long term sustainability of 
Australia’s health system. The main objectives of the reforms are to deliver a nationally unified and locally 
controlled health system that would: 
• introduce new financial arrangements for the Commonwealth and States to share equally the costs of 
growth in the public hospital system; 
• confirm the States’ lead role in public health and as the system managers for public hospital services; and 
• acknowledge the Commonwealth’s lead role in delivering primary health care reform. 
The COAG agreed that the Commonwealth would continue its base funding for hospital services at levels already 
set out in the IGA on Federal Financial Relations and the National Healthcare Agreement, and for the 
Commonwealth to increase its contribution to efficient growth funding for hospitals progressively to 50 percent by 
1 July 2017. 
The COAG also agreed to establish Local Hospital Networks (LHNs) as the basis for the running of the public 
hospital system under a local governance model. Each LHN would involve a single or small group of public 
hospitals with a geographic or functional connection that is large enough to operate efficiently and provide a 
range of hospital services, and small enough to enable LHNs to be effective in the delivery of their local health 
services. Each LHN would be a separate legal entity with its own Governing Council and CEO and would be 
aimed at giving local communities and clinicians a greater say in the delivery of local health services. 
The COAG endorsed proposals to contribute funding for hospitals into a single national pool to be administered 
by an independent national funding body, distinct from Commonwealth and State Departments. This funding will 
include base and growth funding on an activity basis. There would be complete transparency and line of sight of 
respective contributions into the pool and from the pool through State accounts to LHNs. 
The role of the States as system managers for the public hospital services would include system-wide public 
hospital service planning and performance; purchasing of public hospital services; planning, funding and 
delivering capital; and planning, funding (with the Commonwealth) and delivering teaching, research and training. 
The parties further agreed to the establishment of a national approach to activity based funding (ABF), and that 
public hospital services will be funded, wherever possible, on the basis of a national efficient price for each 
service provided in order to make funding more efficient and to help drive efficiency in the delivery of services. 
The national efficient price would be set by an Independent Hospital Pricing Authority. Small rural hospitals would 
continue to be funded by block grants where the ABF alone wouldn’t enable them to maintain community service 
obligations. 
The Commonwealth also undertook to establish Medicare Locals, to co-ordinate and better integrate primary 
health care services in their local communities and regions. It is intended that Medicare Locals and State-funded 
health and community services would work co-operatively to achieve these objectives in each community. 
A National Health Performance Authority is to be established under Commonwealth legislation, that would 
produce reports on the performance of hospitals and primary health care services. In addition, the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care would be tasked with developing, monitoring and implementing 
national standards for improving clinical safety and quality in hospitals and health care settings. 
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EDUCATION REFORM 
Like health policy, there is much reform underway in education policy through the COAG and 
other processes. More resources and emphasis on early childhood development is being 
advanced. School and student performance is under closer scrutiny through literacy and 
numeracy improvement programs, nationwide primary and secondary student testing, and 
the MySchool website. A national curriculum is being designed and negotiated. There is 
growing emphasis on national standards for teachers, improved teacher performance and 
more flexible pay arrangements. There are also new incentives being created for the best 
performing schools, and some decision making is being decentralised and devolved to 
school principals and boards. In addition, there is the Gonski review into school funding 
where the terms of reference require that its recommendations be directed towards achieving 
a funding system beyond 2013 which is transparent, fair, financially sustainable, and 
effective in promoting excellent educational outcomes for all students. 
Major new reforms of vocational education and training (VET) are also underway as set out 
in the Building Australia’s Future Workforce package announced in the 2011-12 Budget. As 
reported by Skills Australia and the PC, much needs to be done on vocational education and 
training in terms of:  
• moving to demand-based funding of students and employers, and to outcomes-based 
funding of registered providers; 
• revamping student fees and their underlying incentive structures including 
co-contributions for Certificate IV courses and above by students and employers; 
• restructuring of apprenticeships and improving linkages of courses to industry needs, as 
well as improved mentoring and career support for apprentices; 
• making public providers more flexible and autonomous, and levelling the playing field 
between public and private providers, as well as improving the VET in schools program; 
• improving the standards of VET trainers and assessors with better rewards for 
excellence, as well as improving the standards, transparency and reporting (including 
via the MySkills website) of all registered providers; 
• increasing support for VET trainers to develop their skills in the use of digital media and 
broadband infrastructure; and  
• increasing the integration between the VET and higher education sectors, including 
improved student pathways from VET to higher educational institutions. 
Major reforms have also been put in place in relation to universities, and 2012 will see 
significant incentive improvements to the whole higher education market when 
Commonwealth funding will be allocated on the basis of the demand by all eligible students 
to attend particular institutions. 
Again, any move to reform the Constitution onto a city and regional basis would be an 
opportunity to improve and greatly expand on the current education reform agenda. The 
COAG could negotiate a reasonably progressive and innovative package with the main 
elements possibly being, as follows:  
• Individual schools would be the cornerstone of the reforms. Ownership of all 
government schools would transfer to the City and Regional Councils, but under charter 
they would become independent units, governed by their own boards and principals, 
who would have control over the direction of each school and the selection of staff. 
State education bureaucracies would be abolished. Restrictions on out-of-area 
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enrolments would also be abolished. Funding would be shared between Federal and 
city and regional administrations on an equitable basis, with the funding for each school 
being demand-driven on the basis of the number of students that enrol in the school 
concerned, with adjustments for area disability factors. 
• There could also be schools networks, administered by local area school authorities on 
behalf of the City and Regional Councils that would have no direct control over schools 
but could co-ordinate pre- schools, primary and secondary schools and technical trade 
colleges, both public and private, that volunteer to join each network. The main task of 
the networks would be to build integrated links giving students and parents multi-choice 
within their network. 
• All schools would be subject to the national curriculum and national Natplan testing, and 
be subject to performance standards with all outcomes published regularly on the 
MySchool website. Also, there would be a national schools inspectorate that would do 
performance audits of every school on a triennial basis.  
• City and Regional Councils would have responsibility for vocational and further (diploma 
standard) education including financial support, where the funding would follow all 
eligible students, as now being introduced for higher education, and with HECs style 
loans to cover student fees. Existing TAFEs could be corporatised or privatised, as new 
community colleges and/or technical trade colleges, with the objective of building better 
career paths to industry and academic paths to university. 
• For higher education, existing public university charters and other governance 
arrangements would be transferred from State and Territory ownership to the City or 
Regional Council in which the central campus is located or have shared ownership 
between several Regional Councils where appropriate. The Federal Government would 
continue to supply almost all of the public financing of higher education. Public 
universities would be free to decide on their own business case including their mix of 
teaching versus research, but would also be accountable for meeting performance and 
financial viability standards. New private universities would be permitted subject to the 
same standards. 
• The Federal Government would retain control over foreign student entry requirements 
to all education sectors, as well as immigration status, in consultation with educational 
institutions, City and Regional Councils and industry and union stakeholders. 
BUSINESS REGULATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Under a revamped Constitution, important business regulation and associated regulatory 
agencies that are already a Commonwealth responsibility under the corporations power or 
have been referred to the Commonwealth by the States and Territories, should obviously 
stay at the Federal level. This covers the tariff protection regime, competition and consumer 
legislation, corporate law and the consumer credit regime. 
In relation to the States and Territories, 27 areas of important regulation covering significant 
areas of business-related activities, are the subject of the COAG’s Seamless National 
Economy negotiations aimed at achieving arrangements that better suit the advancement of 
a single national market. Moreover, the COAG has requested that relevant Ministers and 
officials bring forward options for a further wave of regulatory and competition reforms for its 
ongoing national reform agenda. Obviously, these processes should continue to finality. 
Under the transition to a new Federation, proposed new harmonised legislation under the 
Seamless National Economy processes could be then enacted as overarching law at the 
Federal level for implementation and enforcement by the cities and regions. These uniform 
regimes would offer increasing opportunities for efficiencies for both the public and private 
sectors. The associated regulatory and enforcement agencies should remain at the city and 
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regional level. Existing State-based agencies could come under co-operative joint ownership 
by the City and Regional Councils in that former State, and act on behalf of their new council 
owners on a fee for service basis. This would be consistent with the approach suggested 
above for existing state debt and asset management offices and in conformity with a 
functional division of responsibilities under a revamped Constitution. 
 
BOX 4.3: COAG’S BUSINESS DEREGULATION AGENDA 
In a presentation to the Melbourne Institute’s Economic and Social Outlook Conference, on 2-3 November 2006, 
Gary Banks, Chairman of the Productivity Commission, called upon the COAG to establish nationally a new 
governance and reform framework for regulation, by taking action in the following six areas: 
• Extend the regulation-making framework that the COAG had already agreed upon and strengthen best 
practice in terms of consultation, sanctions for non-compliance and governance principles for all regulatory 
bodies. 
• Apply these principles to Ministerial Councils and national standard-setting bodies to enhance regulatory 
practice, and seek failsafe mechanisms to avoid unwarranted jurisdictional variations from agreed national 
standards. 
• Review the existing stock of regulation in a systematic and coordinated way. 
• Establish mechanisms that ensure regulations remain relevant and effective over time. 
• Agree funding arrangements that provide financial incentives to the States and Territories for an 
appropriate sharing of the costs and benefits of reform. 
• Include in the regulatory reforms provisions for independent monitoring and assessment of progress in 
implementing agreed reforms. 
Against a background of mounting pressure to take further actions on business deregulation, the COAG agreed, 
on 26 March 2008, to a far reaching and accelerated business regulation reform agenda across 27 areas of 
regulation covering issues such as occupational health and safety (OH&S) regulation, environmental assessment 
processes, food regulation, and rail safety regulation. This reform agenda was aimed at achieving a Seamless 
National Economy for reducing the costs of regulation and enhancing productivity and workforce mobility in areas 
of shared Commonwealth and State responsibilities. 
Unfortunately, there has been increasing criticism that the Seamless National Economy processes are making 
too slow a progress and have become bogged down in inter-jurisdictional negotiations. Recognising that some 
important progress has been made, the COAG agreed in February 2011 to bring forward its final completion date 
for the Seamless National Economy agenda from June 2013 to December 2012. In addition, the COAG asked 
relevant Ministers and officials to bring forward options for a further wave of regulatory and competition reforms. 
However, the CRC has now reported that 12 reforms are at risk of not being completed by December 2012, 
including on harmonised OH&S laws, a national trade licensing system, national regulation of the legal 
profession, and energy reform. The CRC has thus urged the COAG to take swift action on these reforms because 
“time is running out”. 
At its February 2011 meeting, the COAG also agreed to a comprehensive reform plan for a new system of 
Ministerial Councils. These changes included a fundamental shift towards a council system focussed on strategic 
national priorities and new ways for the COAG and its Ministerial Councils to identify and address issues of 
national significance. The COAG effectively halved the number of Councils from over 40 to 23, comprising 12 
permanent Standing Councils, six temporary Select Councils and five Legislative & Governance Fora. 
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Industrial relations remain the one area where there isn’t bipartisan support for the way 
ahead. All other areas of microeconomic reform from 1983 onwards have aimed essentially 
for flexible and competitive markets, including pro-competitive regulation where appropriate. 
The labour market is different. Both sides of politics agree on a reasonable degree of 
flexibility, but different models. One model is for mainly devolved markets between free 
agents that are demanding and supplying labour, underpinned by individual contracts. The 
other model embraces enterprise bargaining between employers and collective labour (that 
is, a central role for unions), underpinned by certified agreements. Ultimately, this is an 
ideological issue. However, in reality both models, at least in their original form (that is, 
enterprise bargaining introduced by the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments and the 
Workplace Relations Act introduced by the Howard Coalition Government in 2006), have 
proven flexible and adaptable to rapidly changing economic and industrial circumstances. 
Accordingly, neither economic theory nor empirical study is likely to judge one model clearly 
more flexible than the other, at least in their original forms, in terms of promoting greater 
productivity growth and participation rates, and advancing overall wellbeing. 
The reality of the political economy means that, in each jurisdiction, we are tending to swing 
from one model to the other as we move from centre-right to centre-left administrations and 
back again under our democratic processes. In addition, at the national level, we are in a 
process of seeking to move to a single industrial relations framework using the corporations 
power as well as some referral of powers to cover unincorporated enterprises and the State 
public sector. However, this is a protracted and difficult process that is unlikely to be fully 
realised. 
A two tier based constitutional reform would pave the way for achieving a single overarching 
Federal regime with a single nationwide regulator and/or arbitrator. This wouldn’t prevent the 
tendency of swinging from one model to another, subject to the checks and balances of the 
Senate where minority parties and/or independents generally hold the balance of power. But 
it would mean that we would have a single harmonised labour market, which could be of net 
benefit for the allocation of both labour and capital and to the advancement of overall 
national wellbeing. 
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
The resources sector now has a heightened influence on economic outcomes in Australia. It 
has lifted its GDP share appreciably and it is the driving force in our export sector. The 
emergence of modernising and urbanising China and India as serious economic powers, and 
the increasing emergence in this century of the Asian economies now significantly influence 
the movements in our terms of trade and national income, and exchange rate adjustments 
and macroeconomic settings. These drivers are likely to be long lasting. 
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BOX 4.4: FISCAL STABILISATION RULES AND A POSSIBLE NATIONAL FISCAL STABILISATION FUND 
In mid 2010, the IMF recommended that, for the Australian budget, the automatic stabilisers should be allowed to 
operate fully, given that the growing dependence on mining may amplify the business cycle. This would imply 
saving any revenue windfalls and running larger budget surpluses during upswings than in the past to help avoid 
potential overheating and building a buffer against a sharp fall in commodity prices 
More recently, the IMF appears to have gone further. It has suggested that, for countries like Australia that are 
benefitting from higher commodity prices, some of the boost to government revenues could be saved in order to 
ensure a more equal distribution of the benefits across generations and to reduce long term fiscal vulnerabilities 
from an ageing population and rising health care costs. 
Clearly, the national fiscal strategy should take into account the increasing importance to the economy of the 
resources sector and the role being played by the commodity cycle in driving the business cycle. Given the 
proposal under the new Federation model to transfer much of the risks of managing national fiscal balances to 
the Federal Government, serious consideration could be given to the Federal Government adjusting its fiscal 
strategy to take into account the increased fiscal risks and the concurrent increased variability and uncertainty 
from the commodities cycle. This could include instigating new fiscal rules, such as they have in Chile, that 
ensure a certain proportion of resource related revenues are saved by running higher surpluses at the height of 
the cycle once commodity prices exceed a certain threshold. This sort of regime would enable the budget to be 
run with higher surpluses at the top of the commodity cycle alleviating pressure on the exchange rate and interest 
rates to the betterment of all sectors competing with the resources sector. The main objective would be to fortify 
the fiscal position to allow discretionary spending or saving decisions to be made that would bolster automatic 
stabilisers in managing demand fluctuations through the economic cycle.  
As mentioned by the IMF, a further objective could be to create more ‘permanent’ savings to deal with the long 
term fiscal pressures, or to build a fund preserved for future generations if it were judged that the boost to national 
income from resources development was a medium term, not a more long lasting, phenomenon. 
A related question would be to consider how these increased fiscal savings could best be managed. One 
possibility is for the savings to be placed in a fiscal stabilisation fund which, pragmatically, could operate as a 
division of the existing Future Fund and be able to invest both onshore and offshore according to its legislated 
mandate under independent management. The portfolio would of necessity need to include a proportion of more 
liquid assets and some natural hedges against our trading cycle, that could be mobilised to fund discretionary 
stimulus spending at the bottom of the economic cycle. Alternatively, or as a complementary measure, the 
portfolio could be constructed with a view to it being used flexibly as collateral for increased gross borrowing to 
finance fiscal stimulus measures, through the cycle. 
 
It therefore would be sensible in moving away from the current piecemeal policy and 
administrative approach to resource development. In this regard, constitutional reform could 
see an opportunity to transfer policy responsibility to the Federal Government, with 
accompanying administrative and regulatory efficiencies, covering both onshore and offshore 
developments and covering Crown ownership of both minerals and petroleum. Moreover, 
transferring resources taxation to the Federal Government and implementing a wide ranging 
resource rent tax regime would appropriately transfer fiscal risks and automatic stabilisers to 
the Federal Budget. This fiscal framework would also provide room to alleviate pressures on 
other sectors by reducing company tax and addressing skills shortages across the economy, 
as well as greatly improving efficiencies in the resources sector and beyond by abolishing 
State royalties. However, abolishing royalties would probably necessitate a ‘compensation 
deal’ with City and Regional Councils for the funding of public infrastructure necessary to 
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support the resources and related sectors. This could involve not just direct funding by the 
Federal Government of resource regions such as the Kimberley-Pilbara-MidWest, 
Bowen-Whitsundays and Riverlands-Central, but also additional infrastructure funding of City 
Councils such as Perth and Brisbane brought under indirect pressures from resource 
developments, particularly as fly-in-fly-out operations bring population pressures to these 
cities. 
NATIONAL ENERGY FRAMEWORK 
Australia is a major producer, user and exporter of energy, with abundant reserves of coal, 
natural gas, and uranium. We have dwindling reserves of crude oil, but significant potential 
for the production of renewable energy. Energy is obviously a major policy matter for the 
Federal Government and it is increasingly and intrinsically intertwined with climate change 
policy. Under constitutional reform, obviously such important national policy should remain 
under Federal jurisdiction.  
In terms of domestic energy use, responsibility for the integrated national energy market (that 
is, electricity and gas) could be transferred to Federal jurisdiction. In the meantime, there is 
an urgent need for the COAG to finalise the full establishment of the national electricity 
market, including such areas as deregulation of retail pricing, timed metering and the 
provision of necessary interconnection capacity between the five eastern State electricity grid 
networks. 
On abolition of the States, it would probably be an optimal outcome for those electricity 
transmission grids currently owned by the States and Territories to be privatised subject to 
appropriate competition regulation, or transferred to a new Federal grid network owner, the 
National Transmission Company (NTC), that could also be tasked with greatly increasing the 
State-to-State interconnection capacity to facilitate the single market. By that time, it would 
also be optimal from a governance point of view for all electricity generation and retail 
operators currently owned by State or Territory Governments to be fully privatised into the 
competitive generation and retail energy (covering both electricity and gas) markets. 
INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM 
To support growth and wellbeing, there is a need to make sure that existing infrastructure is 
being used as efficiently as possible; that there is transparent analysis of infrastructure 
deficiencies; and that there is robust cost-benefit analyses of all federally-funded new 
projects to assist in determining infrastructure priorities. 
In this regard, in the 2011-12 Budget, the Government announced important reforms that 
should drive lasting improvements to the way Australia plans, finances and builds the 
infrastructure needed to compete in the 21st century. The reform package included: 
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BOX 4.5: THE COAG REFORMS OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS 
Reform of the Australian electricity industry commenced in the early 1990s. At that time, the electricity supply 
industry in each State or Territory was generally characterised by a vertically integrated government-owned 
monopoly responsible for the generation, transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity; prices were set by 
these monopoly utility companies and/or Government Ministers; and there was limited physical interconnection of 
the network and no proper trading of electricity across State and Territory borders. 
From the mid-1990’s into the current century, National Competition Policy (NCP) significantly reformed Australia’s 
energy markets, through the disaggregation of the elements of the energy supply chain; the introduction of 
competition in electricity generation and gas and electricity retailing; and the corporatisation and, in some States 
and Territories privatisation, of energy assets. 
In recent years, the central focus of the COAG reform agenda has been the development of national regulatory 
frameworks. National energy regulatory institutions now include: 
• the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) which is responsible for economic regulation of transmission and 
distribution networks for the national electricity market (NEM) and for gas pipelines for all States except 
Western Australia; 
• a new Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) for the NEM and the gas market; 
• the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) which is responsible for rule-making, market 
development and policy advice concerning the NEM and access to natural gas pipelines services and 
elements of the broader natural gas markets; and 
• the National Competition Council (NCC) which determines access arrangements for electricity 
transportation and access arrangements for gas.  
As a result of reforms over the past two decades there is now structural separation of the monopoly network 
elements (transmission and distribution) and the competitive elements (generation and retail) in the gas and 
electricity sectors; there has been full privatisation of electricity businesses in Victoria and South Australia, partial 
privatisation in NSW, and corporatisation and competitive neutrality arrangements in other states for their 
government-owned energy businesses; there has been full privatisation of gas transmission businesses, and 
privatisation of distribution and retail gas businesses in most states; a competitive wholesale market exists for 
electricity and there is competition in the retail gas market and growing contestability in electricity retail; and 
national third party access regimes are in place for electricity and gas networks.  
 
• Enhancements to Infrastructure Australia (IA) with a 40 per cent increase in its funding 
so that it can expand its work to provide independent policy advice on national 
infrastructure reform, such as National Port and Freight Strategies, while working with 
governments and the private sector to develop a deeper ‘pipeline’ of priority 
infrastructure projects in the Australian market. 
• Greater independence and financial autonomy for IA with a revamped governing council 
to strike a balance between experience and renewal, as well as enabling IA’s 
assessments of projects (including cost-benefit analysis) to be published. 
• Removal of impediments to private sector investment (particularly by superannuation 
funds) in infrastructure by establishing special tax provisions for infrastructure projects 
designated to be of national significance. 
• Establishment of an Infrastructure Financing Group of private and public sector advisers 
to identify further areas of work around private financing of infrastructure. 
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• Lengthening of the Commonwealth Government Securities yield curve incrementally, 
when prudent to do so, to help the financing of long term infrastructure projects. 
Constitutional reform could be used to deliver a transparent, coherent and co-operative 
model for delivering infrastructure reform. The COAG could be tasked to complete the 
negotiation of the regulatory frameworks for all sectors including transport, energy and water, 
and for a unified, overarching competition and access regime to govern these frameworks. 
The COAG should be supported by an independent IA, as enhanced by the reforms 
announced in the 2011-12 Federal Budget, that will enable the IA to carry out analysis of 
regulatory inadequacies, infrastructure deficiencies and the cost-benefit analysis of the 
pipeline of new infrastructure projects of national significance (including presumably major 
urban infrastructure networks). The COAG could also call upon the PC to undertake full 
public inquiries into particular sectors, and seek recommendations from the ACCC before 
determining the best course of action for reform. The COAG would then make its 
recommendations to the Federal Parliament (or where appropriate to City and Regional 
Councils) for enactment into legislation. All advice from the COAG, and the IA, PC and 
ACCC, should be made public.  
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Under constitutional reform, responsibility for both transport policy and delivery, whether at 
Federal or city/regional level, would best be determined according to the mode of transport 
and the locational, financial and historic factors involved. 
Clearly, aviation policy and regulatory responsibilities should remain with the Federal 
Government, including international agreements, domestic travel, air safety, and regulatory 
supervision of what is essentially now the privatised network of international, national, 
regional and local airports. The ACCC would continue to monitor and regulate the 
competition framework for the industry including airport charges, slot allocations and terminal 
space. 
Responsibility for road transport policy and regulation should be very much determined by 
locational factors and whether the roads in question are nationally significant, or not. On the 
demand side, road charges could be introduced across the nation by the Federal 
Government, after agreement by the COAG, using latest GPS tracking technology, with 
specific charges being imposed per kilometre for the type of vehicle and type of road (minor, 
major, freeway) used. Revenue would be shared between the two tiers of government as 
well as with private road operators. Toll roads would be made redundant, and public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) would be made more viable as traffic flows would be charged identically 
for using all major roads (or freeways) and would be indifferent to which major traffic route (or 
freeway) is used. In addition, City Councils should be encouraged to introduce congestion 
charges in all five major cities. 
On the supply side, the Federal Government could retain full responsibility for the existing 
national highway system together with all other major inter-city and inter-regional connecting 
highways that the Federal Government could pledge to develop as a truly high quality 
national highway system, just as President Eisenhower championed and commenced the 
Interstate Highway System in the USA more than five decades ago and which was 
essentially completed in the 1990s. This is the type of highway system that is needed to fully 
connect our continental nation to help deliver a truly single market to the economic and social 
wellbeing nationwide. City and Regional Councils would be responsible for all other roads 
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including all intra-city arterials that form part of each city’s strategic plan. In addition, 
Regional Councils would be responsible for all regional and rural connector roads vital for 
rural and regional industries and communities. City and Regional Councils should have the 
financial wherewithal to construct and operate these roads, either by themselves or under 
PPP contracts, given their revenue sharing from the proposed road user charges and 
congestion charges. 
Rail would be difficult as locationally existing State track and signalling networks would need 
to be transferred to the Federal level upon the abolition of State Governments. The best 
solution would be for the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) to merge its existing 
national track network with the State networks under Federal regulatory jurisdiction. As is 
now evolving, all freight train operations would be privatised before the abolition of State 
Governments. Responsibility for passenger services between the major cities would need to 
become a full Federal responsibility, including the possible High Speed Rail connecting 
Brisbane-Newcastle-Sydney-Canberra-Albury-Melbourne, the Indian-Pacific connecting 
Sydney-Perth, the Overland connecting Melbourne-Adelaide, and the Ghan connecting 
Adelaide-Darwin. 
All public transport, including metro, bus, tram and ferry services would be the responsibility 
of the City and Regional Councils, whether supplied in-house or by private contractors under 
subsidy arrangements. Passenger rail services between major cities and regional centres, 
including commuter trains feeding into the city metro networks, would be jointly shared by the 
relevant City and Regional Councils. Through the COAG, these councils could request 
Federal financial support for some of these services where such support would incorporate 
externalities that would not be captured otherwise. 
The ACCC would have responsibility for regulating track network charges by the ARTC, and 
the COAG would need to finalise the establishment of a nationally-based rail safety regulator. 
All ports, whether major resource export facilities or freight container terminals, would need 
to be privatised by the time State Governments are abolished and come under the regulatory 
supervision of the ACCC. Interconnection of ports with the national rail and road freight 
networks would be a Federal responsibility, following recommendations agreed by the 
COAG, after detailed land transport and port analysis and advice by IA, and by the PC as 
required. Coastal and international shipping policy and administration would continue under 
Federal jurisdiction, and again the COAG would need to finalise the arrangements for a 
nationally-based maritime safety regulator covering shipping and ports. 
Postal services would remain a Federal responsibility, without COAG involvement, including 
the degree to which Australia Post would face competitive markets and whether parts of its 
functions could be outsourced or privatised. Also, the degree to which Australia Post would 
deliver other services, such as financial and payment services, and the extent of its 
community service obligations, would continue to be the responsibility of the Federal 
Government. 
Communications policy including telecommunications and the integration of communications 
and media should remain at the Federal level, with the rollout of the National Broadband 
Network (NBN), or some variant thereof, presumably as the foundation infrastructure 
platform of future communications marketing and regulatory developments. The NBN would 
remain regulated by the ACCC, and the PC should be called upon by the Federal 
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Government to investigate NBN milestones in its development stage and to hold a full public 
inquiry before any proposed privatisation of the NBN were to take place in the future. 
LAND USE MANAGEMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Issues of land use management are fundamental to determine the distribution of the nation’s 
land resource base between competing claims for residential and industrial use, resource 
development, agricultural activities, environmental protection, and indigenous land title and 
occupation. Therefore, under the two tier constitution model, it would make sense that all 
non-urban land use management policy and regulation and associated Crown land 
ownership reside with the Federal Government, given that resources, environment and 
indigenous affairs, as well as important aspects of agriculture matters such as water reform, 
would all come under Federal jurisdiction. The administration and delivery of land use 
management services on the ground could then sensibly be delegated to local land 
management offices under city and regional control. 
All urban land could be designated as such for each individual city and town at the time of 
the constitutional reform, with such designated areas encompassing existing city and town 
boundaries as well as areas for future expansion as set out in individual city or town strategic 
plans. Given the interface with proposed City and Regional Council jurisdiction over town and 
city planning and urban development, it would seem appropriate that designated urban land 
use management and any associated Crown ownership of urban land would come under City 
and Regional Council jurisdiction. Proposals for future changes to designated urban areas 
could be assessed by the IA, for agreement by the COAG. 
With constitutional reform, environmental issues could best be handled at the policy and 
assessment level by the Federal Government, and this is where the Federal Government 
should concentrate its efforts and leave program delivery to City and Regional Councils 
under the two-tiered constitutional model. Major policy issues would presumably revolve 
around climate change and the creation of a market for carbon and the renewable energy 
targets, and the likely enormous issue of climate change adaptation. As well, there would 
need to be an ongoing priority for environment protection and land and conservation 
management under the existing Federal environment protection legislation. 
This jurisdiction over environment policy would need to cover both urban and non-urban 
areas, in order to make all parts of the nation accountable under one integrated 
environmental regime that would take into account the likely spillovers of environmental 
effects between urban and non-urban areas, and would enable appropriate trade-offs to be 
made on competing claims. While political and legal disputes would inevitably arise from time 
to time between the two layers of government on certain environmental issues and projects, 
particularly where they were located on urban land, on such occasions City and Regional 
Councils would be stakeholders just like any other player dealing with the Federal 
Government at the time. 
With the Federal Government being responsible for national environmental policy and 
assessment, there would remain plenty of room for the delivery of national programs at the 
city and regional level as agreed within COAG frameworks, including implementing solar 
energy feed-in programs, energy efficiency building codes, local delivery of climate change 
adaptation measures, and locally-based landcare and other environmental protection, 
conservation and heritage programs. 
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WATER REFORM 
The COAG still has much work to do to establish a fully operational water trading market, 
including full tradability between regions and between States. In addition, the COAG has to 
sooner or later grapple with the issue of allowing water trading between rural and urban use. 
Moreover, the Federal Government has much work to do to settle on a Murray-Darling Basin 
Plan that efficiently delivers a balance between economic, social and environmental factors 
acceptable to all stakeholders, and that can be passed by the Federal Parliament.  
Under constitutional reform, Crown ownership of non-urban waterways and artesian basins 
as well as policy and regulatory supervision of the water industry and the development of the 
national water trading market would need to be under Federal jurisdiction, given the 
importance of water as a national asset, and as the water market is likely to straddle many 
city and regional boundaries. Presumably the national market, and its sub-markets, would 
eventually expand beyond just the Murray-Darling Basin and related systems, to cover 
trading in the Greater Artesian Basin as well as coastal river systems, and not only in 
southern regions but in northern regions especially as northern agricultural production 
becomes more viable as climate change evolves. This would require a much expanded 
coverage of the mandate of the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA). Presumably, most 
major cities and regional towns would also trade in water rights in the fully developed market. 
With such market expansion, it would also become necessary to expand the coverage of the 
mandate of the MDBA especially in relation to the imposition of caps on water usage across 
the nation. 
By the time State and Territory Governments are abolished, all irrigation authorities would 
need to be transferred into co-operative ownership or fully privatised as agreed by relevant 
State and Territory Governments with irrigation farmers and other stakeholders. New 
irrigation schemes could be public or private, operating on a commercial basis within the 
overall water market and regulatory arrangements. 
Waterways in designated urban areas could be allocated under Crown ownership and 
jurisdiction to the City and Regional Councils, given the need to integrate the management of 
both land and waterways under city and town planning and urban development powers for 
efficient and effective policy and administration. 
Urban water authorities would need to come under the ownership of the relevant City and 
Regional Councils. Also, the COAG could be tasked with negotiating sensible microeconomic 
reforms of the urban water supply industry, following the current inquiry by the PC. Given the 
ensuing market structure, regulatory supervision would presumably be carried out by the 
ACCC on a uniform national basis as part of a possibly wider mandate covering the national 
water market. Also, councils should be able to pursue further private involvement in urban 
water markets in competition with the existing water authorities or as the contractors of 
services under competitive tender to those authorities, as is already happening with the 
building and operation of desalination plants. 
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BOX 4.6: NATIONAL WATER REFORMS 
(i) Commonwealth and the COAG involvement in water reforms 
Since Federation, responsibility for Australia’s water resources has primarily rested with the States and 
Territories, under section 100 of the Constitution, which provides that “the Commonwealth shall not, by any law or 
regulation of trade or commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to the reasonable use of 
the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation.” 
However, since the 1990s, the COAG has become increasingly involved in water policy in Australia. This increase 
in involvement coincided with the implementation of the National Competition Policy reforms. In 1994, the COAG 
agreed to a Water Reform Framework which established a strategic direction for water reform. Key elements of 
the framework included pricing reform, the clarification of property rights, improved natural resource 
management, water trade reform, and institutional reform. In 1995, the COAG decided that the implementation of 
the Water Reform Framework would come under the umbrella of National Competition Policy, whereby progress 
on water industry reforms was linked with National Competition Policy payments. 
Following on from this Water Reform Framework, the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative 
(NWI) was concluded at the June 2004 COAG meeting. The aim of the NWI is to increase the efficiency of 
Australia's water use, leading to greater certainty for investment and productivity, for rural and urban 
communities, and for the environment. This is to be achieved by developing a more cohesive national approach 
to the way Australia manages, measures, plans for, prices, and trades water. Under the NWI, governments have 
made commitments to prepare water plans with provision for the environment, deal with over-allocated or 
stressed water systems, introduce registers of water rights and standards for water accounting, expand the trade 
in water, improve pricing for water storage and delivery, and meet and manage urban water demands. 
The National Water Commission’s 2009 biennial assessment report on the implementation of the NWI found that, 
despite some progress, the pace of water reform has slowed on almost every front. The report was particularly 
critical of a lack of progress in water planning and the failure to address over-allocation. The report applauded 
progress on water trade, but noted that some State-imposed barriers remain. 
(ii) Murray-Darling Basin reforms 
In addition to the efforts to promote broader water reform, the Commonwealth has worked to improve the 
management of water resources within the Murray-Darling Basin, which spans four States and one Territory.  
In January 2007, the Howard Government announced a $10 billion National Plan for Water Security, which 
sought to improve the efficiency of existing water infrastructure, address over-allocation, and improve metering, 
accounting and water data.  
This package was succeeded by the Rudd Government’s Water for the Future initiative. In return for a share of 
the funding, the Government sought agreement from Basin States to a new Basin wide planning process. In July 
2008, the Commonwealth and the Basin States concluded the Intergovernmental Agreement on Murray-Darling 
Basin Reform, which saw the Basin States refer water planning powers for the Basin to the Commonwealth and 
agreed to the establishment of a new independent MDBA. 
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CITY AND TOWN PLANNING 
The COAG has already laid out a cities strategic planning framework that sets out principles 
for coherent, best practice strategic planning, with an emphasis on economic, social and 
environmental net benefits and the proper integration of infrastructure provision and 
development approval processes into the strategic planning process. Under constitutional 
reform, this overarching framework could be re-endorsed by the COAG as applicable 
nationwide. Moreover, the COAG should be tasked with reporting to the Federal Parliament 
every three years on the compliance and performance of all City Councils and relevant 
Regional Councils under the COAG framework. 
BOX 4.7: THE COAG AGREEMENT ON CAPITAL CITY STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEMS 
On 7 December 2009, the COAG agreed that by 1 January 2012 all States will have in place plans that meet new 
national criteria under the COAG reforms to capital city strategic planning systems. The reforms are to ensure our 
capital cities are well placed for the future, with strong, transparent and long term plans in place to manage 
population and economic growth, as well as climate change, housing affordability and urban congestion. The new 
systems will involve new national criteria that: 
• provide for future-oriented and publicly available long term strategic plans; 
• are integrated across functions (land use, infrastructure, transport) and integrated across the three levels of 
government; 
• support economic growth, population growth and democratic change, productivity and global 
competitiveness, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and efficient development and use of new and 
existing infrastructure; 
• provide for nationally significant economic infrastructure (both new and upgraded existing) including 
transport corridors, international gateways, intermodal connections, major communications and utilities 
infrastructure, and the reservation of land for future expansion; 
• consider and strengthen the networks between capital cities and regional centres and other domestic and 
international connections; 
• provide for planned and sequenced land release and a balance of infill and greenfields development; 
• clearly identify priorities for future investment and policy effort by government and effective frameworks for 
private sector investment and innovation; 
• encourage world-class urban design and architecture; and 
• provide for effective implementation arrangements and supporting consultation and engagement 
mechanisms with external stakeholders. 
The CRC was also tasked with independently reviewing the consistency of capital city strategic planning systems 
with these new national criteria. The CRC will also support continuous national improvement in strategic planning 
and build and share knowledge of best-practice planning approaches. 
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BOX 4.8: CANBERRA AS A SPECIAL CASE: NATIONAL CAPITAL AND WORKABLE REGIONAL CITY 
Canberra would retain its special status as the national capital and seat of the Federal Parliament, executive 
government and public administration. However, the governance arrangements over strategic planning for the 
national capital are a dilemma. It has been argued that the existing arrangements whereby the national capital 
aspects of Canberra are the responsibility of the Federal Government, under the National Capital Authority 
(NCA), and the city planning and development approval aspects are handled by the ACT Government, aren’t 
working well. Similarly, handing all responsibilities to either the Federal or ACT Government wouldn’t be 
satisfactory as neither would be able to carry out both national and city responsibilities in an objective and 
accountable way. One option would be to have a joint Federal/ACT authority to handle all aspects of strategic 
planning responsibilities for the entire Canberra-Queanbeyan conurbation, thus integrating national capital 
aspects with land use, transport and environment planning. 
The new joint authority could be given a revamped, more visionary charter to preserve at least what remains of 
the Griffin legacy, particularly the layout of the inner national capital precinct with its grand vistas based on 
geometric lines, angles and circles, and with the focal points, as envisaged by Walter Burley Griffin, such as 
Capital Hill, Red Hill, Mt Ainslie and Black Mountain. Griffin’s vision was to overlay this layout with an ‘Organic 
City’ of grand monumental, architectural and landscape dimensions that was never implemented. Over the years, 
city planners have moved from Griffin’s more compact European city design to a more spread out garden city 
based on a less dense foreshore development, neighbourhoods and suburbs, motorways, and a more natural 
landscaping consistent with the local ”Australian” surroundings.  
The joint authority should also be tasked, and adequately resourced, to preserve the lake and its foreshores and 
wetlands, the parliamentary triangle, the war memorial precinct, the defence complex and the military academy 
precinct. The new and old Parliament Houses and all national institutions should be maintained to the highest 
standards. As well, the joint authority could promote the heart of the capital as a place to celebrate our 
achievements as a nation, and to fully appreciate our parliamentary, cultural, historic and indigenous institutions, 
traditions and conventions amidst Canberra’s natural landscape. 
Beyond its role as the national capital, Canberra would need to continue to thrive as a functional, liveable city that 
would also serve as the centre of the newly-created Monaro Region. The ACT boundaries would be dissolved 
and Queanbeyan included in the greater Canberra city limits. To ensure that Canberra develops as a workable 
and liveable regional city, the joint authority would need to continue the process of redesigning Canberra away 
from the long failed Y-Plan, with the future city population radiating in interconnected concentric circles from the 
current heart of inner Canberra. Urban infill and consolidation, and densification along transport corridors and 
around town centres, would give a greater efficiency and continuity to the city, enhancing social, economic and 
community coherence and sustainability. As Canberra-Queanbeyan approaches a projected population of 
between 430,000 and 500,000 residents by 2032, a mass transit system may be feasible that would interconnect 
inner Canberra, the town centres (including Molonglo and Queanbeyan) and the proposed Majura-to-Hume 
industrial and technology corridor (including the airport). 
 
Despite the new COAG strategic planning framework, city planning remains a major problem. 
For most major cities, multiple local jurisdictions represent an obstacle to State Governments 
properly implementing longer term strategic plans. For instance, Sydney is governed by 43 
local councils which means local development processes often clash with strategic plans 
particularly in stymieing efforts to increase density along transport corridors. Moreover, State 
Governments have overall performed poorly at co-ordinating infrastructure provision. With 
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the establishment of City and Regional Councils under constitutional reform, a major reform 
could be achieved by handing uniform responsibility for strategic planning, urban 
infrastructure, and residential and industrial development approval processes over to the 
relevant City or Regional Council, with the objective of improved outcomes for urban 
development along major transport corridors, and better location of residential developments 
that allows easier access for all residents to employment opportunities. Significant 
administrative efficiencies and cost savings would also be achieved. 
Housing supply is now a major political and economic issue as strong population growth and 
inadequate planning and development approval processes mean that increasingly demand 
for housing is outstripping the ability to supply the required housing stock. Moreover, 
infrastructure charges by both State and local governments have resulted in inefficiencies 
and inequities being built into the land and housing supply chain. City and Regional Councils 
may give an institutional and governance structure that could eventually overcome obstacles 
to the adequate supply of housing. The COAG could reinvigorate its current efforts, with 
advice from the PC, to agree on a policy framework that would guide the new Councils in 
solving the continued housing shortages. 
In addition, by the time of the abolition of the States and Territories, each public housing 
authority should be wound up and its assets sold to the private, co-operative or not-for-profit 
sectors. From then on all public housing subsidies could be delivered through Rent 
Assistance from the Federal Government, as recommended by the AFTS review, and all 
emergency public housing needs could be delivered by City and Regional Council 
community service departments via private, co-operative or not-for-profit providers. 
Significant administrative savings would be possible. 
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 
Given the central place of Australia’s indigenous peoples in our nation’s historical, settlement 
and cultural development over the past 40,000-60,000 years, as well as the significant 
challenges of resolving indigenous disadvantage, indigenous affairs and indigenous land title 
issues should clearly be a Federal Government responsibility incorporated directly into the 
Constitution. The revamped Constitution should specifically provide for this allocation of 
powers, along with a statement of recognition of our indigenous peoples and their 
contribution to our nation including the importance of the distinct and unique cultures of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island peoples and their prior and continuing ownership of the 
land. 
It could be argued that economists and microeconomic reform have little, if anything, to 
contribute to resolving indigenous issues of dispossession, deprivation and disadvantage. 
However, if we are serious about advancing the wellbeing of the Australian people, then we 
need to focus on this issue. There are important microeconomic reform issues relating to 
education attainment, workforce participation, economic development opportunities, and 
regional and remote development that need to be addressed. 
The resolution of indigenous land ownership should be the responsibility of the Federal 
Government. Certainty of tenure is imperative for effective and sustainable economic 
development, whether through the recognition of native title or other settlement processes. 
Delivery of programs and services to indigenous peoples and their communities could be the 
responsibility of the Federal Government either by funding its indigenous initiatives, such as 
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housing, health, education, and law and order, directly into mainstream City and Regional 
Council programs, or by delegating specific Federal indigenous programs to city and regional 
authorities, as provided for under the flexibility provisions proposed for such delegations 
under the revamped Constitution. In addition, the Federal Government could enter into 
agreements with autonomous indigenous communities to deliver services and programs on 
the ground. 
PROVISION OF LOCAL UTILITIES AND MUNICIPAL SERVICES 
Under constitutional reform, the provision of basic local utilities services of electricity and gas 
would be provided through national markets and private sector retailers in active competition 
as outlined above. Town and city water supplies would be provided predominantly by local 
water authorities as outlined above with the prospect of evolving microeconomic reform of 
urban water supply markets in the future. 
All other municipal services would be consolidated for delivery by the new City and Regional 
Councils, with multiple council offices in each jurisdiction to provide the appropriate public 
access to these services. Such services would include family and community services, 
community health services, emergency housing, and consumer advocacy, as well as local 
museums and heritage protection, and educational support services and local library 
services. 
Essential services such as fire brigade, ambulance and SES emergency services and rural 
fire services would also be the direct responsibility of the City and Regional Councils. 
Registration of births, deaths and marriages, as well as land titles registration, would also 
remain at the local council office level, but the responsibility for the development of a 
nationwide electronic and historic data base management system could be designated to 
newly established central agencies at the Federal level. 
PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION 
The Federal Government would, of course, continue to be serviced by the Australian Public 
Service, under the guidance of a well-resourced Australian Public Service Commission 
(APSC). The organisation of Federal public administration should continue under the model 
of having about 17 or 18 super ministerial portfolios with a core policy department at the 
centre of each portfolio. This model has served us well since its introduction by the Hawke 
Government in the 1980s. 
At the time of the abolition of the States and Territories, much State bureaucracy could also 
be abolished or significantly scaled down, and the Federal and local government 
bureaucracies subjected to widespread streamlining. This would be particularly so, given the 
proposed role to be played by health and education networks, the integration of city and town 
planning and infrastructure development, and the Federal takeover of important new powers 
previously held by the States in areas such as taxation, business regulation, resources and 
energy, land use management, and environmental protection, and the establishment of the 
proposed National Judicial System. This would mean both tiers of government could run 
much more efficient bureaucracies. 
The City Councils could probably be able to copy the super ministerial portfolio model from 
the Federal jurisdiction given their importance and resource base. For Regional Councils, 
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this would raise more difficult issues as they would be required to delivery significant 
activities but with less mature and less well-resourced administrative bases. However, the 
ACT has built up a feasible and workable city-state administrative structure around 5 or 6 
ministerial, policy and service delivery portfolio structures. This could be one model that 
could evolve over time for Regional Councils to follow. 
It would be important for each jurisdiction to have a Public Service Commission, of varying 
sizes, that would be responsible for strategic leadership and guidance of each public service 
and to ensure that the public service remains transparent and accountable for its 
performance. To nurture and encourage future public service reform across all jurisdictions, 
the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) could be the lead player, and the 
Australian Public Service Commissioner could be tasked by the COAG to co-ordinate these 
reform activities with fellow public service commissioners from the cities and regions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
The Federation has served Australia well for the past 110 years. It has great attributes that 
should be preserved. It has brought unity while preserving diversity, as well as political and 
social stability, democratic vitality, and economic progress and financial stability. While the 
Federation isn’t broken, it needs updating and modernising. It has shortcomings probably not 
contemplated by the founding fathers and certainly not conducive to the challenges of the 
21st century. The balance of power within the Federation has shifted increasingly to the 
centre, and that is probably the reality of Australia as a modern globalised economy and 
society. The roles and responsibilities between the tiers of government are confused and 
unclear, and the delivery of policy outcomes to local communities is sadly lacking. Economic 
reforms are faltering, with States and local government no longer having the wherewithal to 
deliver on the tasks assigned to them. 
The overarching objective of advocating constitutional reform, as proposed in this paper, is to 
open up a series of opportunities for Australia to embed a new set of institutions, processes 
and incentive structures for policy making that would be conducive to capturing the benefits 
of productivity, efficiency and growth, as well as cooperation, accountability, sustainability 
and service delivery, thus enhancing the wellbeing of the Australian people. 
This paper argues that the proposed restructuring of the Federation onto a cities and regional 
basis would bring a more feasible and efficient balance between the tiers of government, that 
recognises the realities of Australia in a globalised world and that could lay the foundation for 
significant economic, social and environmental reforms. The paper doesn’t argue for a 
dismantling of the Federation, and recognises the clear benefits that the Federation has 
delivered to the nation. However, it does argue that the Federation needs to be revamped 
and repaired. There needs to be injected into the Constitution factors that would result in a 
rebalancing of the powers between the tiers of government and addressing the trade-offs to 
bring that rebalancing about. This would include moving the Federation towards a more 
centralised model but at the same time strengthening the decentralisation elements of the 
Federation under the second tier of government so that they can deliver appropriately to the 
citizens and communities of our cities and regions. The seven major drivers for such an 
outcome would be: 
1. Clear Roles and Responsibilities: The Constitution would clearly designate roles and 
responsibilities between the two tiers of government. Constitutional powers would still be 
set out under major ‘subject’ headings. However, within these heads of powers, roles and 
responsibilities would be allocated on a ‘functional’ basis. On the one hand, the Federal 
Government would be tasked to concentrate on national policy design, legislative 
frameworks and financing regimes. On the other hand, City and Regional Councils would 
be tasked with implementing national policies and programs and service delivery to regional 
and local communities, particularly the delivery of the new health and education networks, 
with them also retaining significant urban, regional and local responsibilities over strategic 
planning, urban infrastructure, and public transport. The aim would be to assign to the 
appropriate tier of government those tasks that it is judged that tier would be best suited to 
undertake. 
2. A Cities and Regional Approach: In moving to a cities and regional basis for a new 
Constitution, the aim would be to take advantage of the diversity of Australia as a nation 
continent, while at the same time reinforcing and enhancing the flexibility, dynamism and 
competitive environment inherently built into the existing three-tiered Federation. The cities 
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and regional level seems to be the appropriate point at which to condense State and local 
government into a single layer, that would sharpen the focus on service delivery of national, 
urban, regional and local programs, while at the same time opening up opportunities to 
significantly streamline public administration. The move to a two tier based Federation 
would shift the balance of power further towards central government, but this would be 
counter-balanced by a delegation of authority with matching revenue raising powers to a 
new and consolidated second layer of government, thus empowering the cities and regions 
in a way that currently doesn’t exist. We need to address head-on the reality that 
constitutional powers are increasingly moving to Commonwealth control, with the 
development of greater tensions between the centre and the lower levels of government, 
and the increasing faltering of many economic, social and environmental reforms necessary 
to safeguard the wellbeing of the Australian people.  
3. The COAG as the forum for unifying and consolidating the Federation: While the 
two tier based model would deliver significantly more power to the Federal Government 
over major national policy areas, the voice of the City and Regional Councils would be 
better heard at the national level through a revamped COAG which would have a clear, 
significant and central role in the policy fabric and workings of the Federation, as 
recognised under the new Constitution. The COAG would serve as the main forum through 
which the design of national policy reform would be integrated with best practice program 
implementation and service delivery on a consensual basis, and would be a fundamental 
institution for a united and consolidated Federation. Moreover, the COAG would be fully 
supported with independent analysis, advice and recommendations from its own secretariat 
as well as the CRC, PC, IA and ACCC. 
4. Credible and cohesive Macroeconomic Policy Framework: The proposed national 
fiscal strategy and tax reforms would deliver a credible and comprehensive macroeconomic 
policy framework necessary to underpin economic stability, growth and prosperity in the 
new Federation. Importantly, fiscal risks would be shifted decisively to the Federal 
Government in terms of both cyclical budget risks as well as carrying the longer term fiscal 
risks, particularly from the projected growth in health expenditures and the uncertainties 
facing the financing of our future defence capability. Moreover, the City and Regional 
Councils would be supplied with new, enhanced and more stable sources of revenues such 
as the proposed new cash flow consumption tax and the proposed new land tax that would 
give the new Councils the wherewithal to carry out their functions properly. To complement 
this, the new IGA on Federal Financial Relations must be implemented fully so that the 
Federal government desists from seeking to control inputs under federally funded programs 
and Cities and Regional Councils are given full autonomy, and are held accountable for 
delivering outcomes, under a robust, measurable and transparent performance monitoring 
system. 
5. Incentives and opportunities for a significant new Microeconomic Reform 
Agenda: The revamping of the Federation, including the negotiations leading to that 
revamping and subsequent deliberations by the COAG, would reinforce the case for 
constitutional reform and a new Federal governance system on the basis that such changes 
would present to Australia greatly enhanced opportunities for achieving the sorts of 
economic, social and environmental reforms necessary to maintain and enhance our place 
in a rapidly changing and globalising world. In various areas of major national policy 
concern, where the powers between the two tiers of government would need to be 
redefined or clarified as part of the constitutional reform process, opportunities for 
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advancing microeconomic reforms would arise because of the interaction of the following 
factors: 
• The redefinition and clarification of various powers between the two tiers of government 
would of itself result in major reforms. The act of abolition of the States, and the 
reassignment of their powers, is central to this process. 
• The defining of various powers for allocation between the two tiers of government on a 
functional basis (that is, between national policy frameworks and service delivery to 
local communities) would facilitate the opportunity for implementation of major areas of 
reform. 
• The new structures and incentives built into the constitutional framework for the new 
Federation, including through the enhanced COAG model, would greatly improve the 
chances of achieving major reforms, right across the whole policy spectrum, and be 
fundamental for the ongoing process of reform that could endure on a longer term 
basis.  
Out of this powerful interaction of factors within the new Federation, one could envisage a 
range of examples where microeconomic reform of major policy areas could be achieved, as 
follows: 
(i) a revamped Federation, particularly the move to a cities and regional approach, could 
be particularly instrumental in finally sorting out the health system issues and 
enhancing the system of local networks. Federal responsibility could focus on policy 
design, insurance, pharmaceutical benefits and the funding of the growing health 
expenditure gap. Cities and regions could focus on regional and local service delivery 
through the new integrated and autonomous service networks;  
(ii) the move to reform the Constitution onto a city and regional basis would be an 
opportunity to improve and greatly expand on the current education reform agenda in 
an innovative way including enhancing the moves to greater school autonomy, 
transparency and accountability, and exploring possible networking of schools; 
(iii) constitutional reform could see an opportunity to transfer policy responsibility to the 
Federal Government over both onshore and offshore resources development and 
covering Crown ownership of both minerals and petroleum, and to put in place a 
comprehensive and cohesive national, fiscal and taxation regime for what is now a 
pivotal sector driving the economy; 
(iv) there would be increased opportunities to sort out the roles and responsibilities for the 
delivery of land transport investment and urban and nationally significant infrastructure, 
and to move to governance at the city and regional level so that Australia could finally 
deliver on urban strategic planning and address the co-ordination of urban 
infrastructure and the issues surrounding congestion and the supply and affordability of 
housing; and  
(v) revamping roles and responsibilities between the two tiers of government and linkages 
through the COAG would bring the structures and incentives for addressing energy and 
water reform and fundamental environment issues in the national interest. 
6. Diversity and competition within the Federation: The factors driving economic 
reform would also allow the cities and regions to concentrate on underlying issues such as 
transport and energy costs, infrastructure quality and reliability, workforce skills, and 
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political and social stability, as well as variable tax rates, that would underpin the diversity, 
flexibility, dynamism and competitiveness of the revamped Federation. 
7. Streamlining of public administration: Finally, the proposed revamping of the 
Federation would offer the real prospect of delivering significant efficiencies and effective 
public administration across the country. The dismantling of State bureaucracies, and the 
streamlining of Federal and local government bureaucracies, could present a major 
opportunity to trim the size of government, and make more effective the delivery of services 
to citizens, communities and business enterprises across the country, on a cities and 
regional basis. 
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ATTACHMENT A: PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF 
POWERS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND CITY/REGIONAL TIERS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
HEADS OF 
POWER 
FEDERAL POWERS CITY AND 
REGIONAL 
POWERS 
SHARED POWERS AS 
DELEGATED TO CITY 
AND REGIONAL 
COUNCILS 
Foreign Affairs & 
Trade 
 
All Federal 
Responsibilities. 
Defence & 
National 
Security 
 
All Federal 
Responsibilities. 
Justice & Law 
Enforcement 
National Judicial 
System. 
National Policing. 
Criminal & Civilian 
Code. 
Police Forces.
Prison Services. 
National Fiscal 
Strategy 
Charter of Budget 
Honesty. 
Charter of Budget 
Honesty. 
Revenue Raising 
 
 
Personal Tax. 
Company Tax. 
Custom & Excise. 
Resource Taxes. 
Consumption 
Taxes. 
Land Taxes. 
Service Charges. 
Financial Sector 
 
 
RBA Act. 
Financial & Credit 
Regulation. 
G20 & IFIs. 
Microeconomic 
Reform 
 
 
COAG. 
PC. 
IA. 
ACCC. 
COAG COAG. 
PC. 
IA. 
ACCC. 
Population 
Strategy 
 
All Federal 
Responsibilities. 
Immigration Policy & Admin.
Visa Processing. 
Detention Centres. 
Community 
Services. 
Settlement Services.
 
Welfare to Work 
 
Social Security.
Income Transfers. 
Jobs Network. 
Community 
Services. 
Education and 
Skills Training. 
Federal Regional 
Network. 
Health Reform 
 
National Policy. 
Growth Finance. 
Medicare. 
Hospital 
Ownership. 
Clinic Ownership. 
 
Health & Hospital 
Networks. 
Education 
Reform 
 
National Policy.
School, TAFE & 
University Funding. 
Innovation.  
School & TAFE 
Ownership & 
Funding. 
University 
Ownership. 
 
Education Networks.
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HEADS OF 
POWER 
FEDERAL POWERS CITY AND 
REGIONAL 
POWERS 
SHARED POWERS AS 
DELEGATED TO CITY 
AND REGIONAL 
COUNCILS 
Business 
Regulation 
Competition & 
Business Law. 
Corporations Law. 
Tariff Regime. 
COAG Harmonised 
Seamless National 
Economy Reforms. 
Industrial 
Relations 
 
All Federal 
Responsibilities. 
Resources 
Development 
 
All Federal 
Responsibilities. 
COAG Resources 
Reforms. 
National Energy 
Framework 
National Energy 
Market. 
Transmission Grid. 
Regulation of 
Electricity & Gas. 
COAG Reforms of the 
National Energy Market. 
Infrastructure, 
Transport & 
Communications  
National Transport 
and Infrastructure. 
Aviation Policy & 
Regulation. 
Road Pricing. 
Rail Track Network. 
Inter-City Rail. 
Ports Strategy & 
Regulation. 
Communications. 
Urban, Regional & 
Local 
Infrastructure. 
Congestion 
Charges. 
Public Transport. 
Inter-Regional 
Rail. 
COAG Reforms of 
Transport & 
Infrastructure. 
Land Use 
Management & 
the Environment 
Non-Urban Land Use 
Management. 
Environmental Policy 
& Assessment. 
Climate Change. 
Carbon Market. 
Renewables Target. 
Urban Land Use 
Management.  
 
Local Land Management 
Offices. 
COAG National 
Environmental 
Programs. 
 
Water Reform Water Policy. 
Non-Urban 
Waterways & Basins.  
Water Trading. 
ACCC Regulation. 
Urban Waterways.
Urban Water 
Authorities. 
COAG Water Reforms.
City and Town 
Planning 
Planning Policy
& Regulation. 
 
COAG Strategic 
Planning Framework. 
COAG Housing Supply 
Framework. 
Indigenous 
Affairs 
Policy & Regulation.
Land Title. 
Education, Health 
& Community 
Services. 
Community 
Policing. 
Special Indigenous
Programs. 
Law and Order. 
Local Utilities & 
Municipal 
Services 
Data Base System for 
Land Titles and Birth, 
Death & Marriages. 
Mainly City & 
Regional 
Responsibilities. 
Public Service 
and 
Administration 
 
Australian Public 
Service. 
City & Regional 
Council Public 
Services. 
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ATTACHMENT B: PROPOSED FIVE CITY COUNCILS AND 
NINETEEN REGIONAL COUNCILS 
 
PROPOSED CITY COUNCILS 
 
Code City Popn 
(‘000) 
Area Covered 
SYD Sydney 4,472 Sydney Basin but not Central Coast 
MEL Melbourne 3,996 Limits as defined in long term strategic plan 
BRI Brisbane 2,004 Greater Brisbane including Ipswich 
ADE Adelaide 1,187 Greater Adelaide including Gawler 
PER Perth 1,742 Greater Perth and corridor south to Mandurah 
 Total 13,401  
 
PROPOSED NSW/ACT REGIONAL COUNCILS 
 
Code Region Popn 
(‘000)
Major Centres in the Region 
HUN Hunter 676 Newcastle, Cessnock, Maitland, Muswellbrook, 
Singleton 
ILL Illawarra 431 Wollongong, Nowra, Southern Highlands 
NR Northern Rivers 485 Tweed, Lismore, Ballina, Pt Macquarie, Grafton 
MNE Macquarie-New 
England 
510 Tamworth, Armidale, Dubbo, Bathurst, Orange, 
Broken Hill  
MON Monaro 569 Canberra, Queanbeyan, Goulburn, South Coast 
RH Riverina-Hume 325 Wagga Wagga, Albury-Wodonga 
 Total 2,997  
 
PROPOSED VIC REGIONAL COUNCILS 
 
Code Region Popn 
(‘000)
Major Centres in the Region 
BG Barwon-Grampians 598 Geelong, Warrnambool, Ballarat, Horsham 
MM Murray-Mallee 539 Bendigo, Mildura, Wangaratta, Shepparton 
GIP Gippsland 262 Latrobe Valley, Bass Coast, Sale, Bairnsdale 
 Total 1,397  
 
PROPOSED QLD REGIONAL COUNCILS 
 
Code Region Popn 
(‘000)
Major Centres in the Region 
GC Gold Coast 582 Southport, Surfers Paradise, Robina, Tweed 
Heads 
BSC Burnett-Sunshine 
Coast 
610 Caloundra, Maroochydore, Hervey Bay, 
Bundaberg 
DD Darling Downs 358 Toowoomba, Warwick 
BW Bowen-Whitsundays 406 Rockhampton, Gladstone, Mackay 
CY Cape York 531 Townsville, Cairns, Mt Isa 
 Total 2,488  
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PROPOSED SA/NT REGIONAL COUNCILS 
 
Code Region Popn 
(‘000)
Major Centres in the Region 
RC Riverlands-Central 437 Mt Barker, Barossa, Mt Gambier, Pt Pirie, Whyalla
NT Northern Territory 226 Darwin, Alice Springs 
 Total 663  
 
PROPOSED WA REGIONAL COUNCILS 
 
Code Region Popn 
(‘000)
Major Centres in the Region 
SWG South 
West-Goldfields 
356 Bunbury, Albany, Wheatbelt, Kalgoorlie 
KPM Kimberley-Pilbara-Mi
dWest 
148 Pt Hedland, Karratha, Geraldton, Broome, 
Kununurra, Derby 
 Total 503  
 
PROPOSED TAS REGIONAL COUNCILS 
 
Code Region Popn 
(‘000)
Major Centres in the Region 
DTM Derwent-Tamar-Mer
sey 
503 Hobart, Launceston, Burnie, Devonport 
 Total 503  
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ATTACHMENT C: PROPOSED CITY AND REGIONAL COUNCILS INCLUDING PARLIAMENTARY 
REPRESENTATION 
CITIES AND REGIONS POP'N 
('000) 
CAPITAL NO. OF 
SEATS IN 
HOUSE  
NO. OF SENA-
TORS 
MAJOR CENTRES IN THE CITY OR REGION 
Sydney 4,472 Sydney 41 7 Sydney Basin but not Central Coast 
Melbourne 3,996 Melbourne 36 7 Limits as defined in long term strategic plan 
Brisbane 2,004 Brisbane 18 7 Greater Brisbane including Ipswich 
Adelaide 1,187 Adelaide 11 7 Greater Adelaide including Gawler 
Perth 1,742 Perth 16 7 Greater Perth and corridor south to Mandurah 
Total Cities 13,401 122 35
Hunter 676 Newcastle 6 5 Newcastle, Cessnock, Maitland, Muswellbrook, Singleton 
Illawarra 431 Wollongong 4 3 Wollongong, Nowra, Southern Highlands 
Northern Rivers 485 Pt Macquarie 4 3 Tweed, Lismore, Ballina, Pt Macquarie, Grafton 
Macquarie-New England 510 Armidale 5 5 Tamworth, Armidale, Dubbo, Bathurst, Orange, Broken Hill 
Monaro 569 Canberra 5 5 Canberra, Queanbeyan, Goulburn, South Coast 
Riverina-Hume 325 Albury-
Wodonga 
3 3 Wagga Wagga, Albury-Wodonga 
Barwon-Grampians 598 Geelong 5 5 Geelong, Warrnambool, Ballarat, Horsham 
Murray-Mallee 539 Bendigo 5 5 Bendigo, Mildura, Wangaratta, Shepparton 
Gippsland 262 Yallourn 2 3 Latrobe Valley, Bass Coast, Sale, Bairnsdale 
Gold Coast 582 Surfers 
Paradise 
5 5 Southport, Surfers Paradise, Robina, Tweed Heads 
Burnett-Sunshine Coast 610 Maroochydore 6 5 Caloundra, Maroochydore, Hervey Bay, Bundaberg 
Darling Downs 358 Toowoomba 3 3 Toowoomba, Warwick 
Bowen-Whitsundays 406 Rockhampton 4 3 Rockhampton, Gladstone, Mackay 
Cape York 531 Townsville 5 5 Townsville, Cairns, Mt Isa 
Riverlands-Central 437 Barossa 4 3 Mt Barker, Barossa, Mt Gambier, Pt Pirie, Whyalla 
Northern Territory 226 Darwin 2 3 Darwin, Alice Spring 
South West-Goldfields 356 Albany 3 3 Bunbury, Albany, Wheatbelt, Kalgoorlie 
Kimberley-Pilbara-MidWest 148 Karratha 1 3 Pt Hedland, Karratha, Geraldton, Broome, Kununurra, Derby 
Derwent-Tamar-Mersey 503 Hobart 5 5 Hobart, Launceston, Burnie, Devonport 
Total Regions 8,551 78 75
TOTAL 21,952 200 110   
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ATTACHMENT D: INDICATIVE MAP OF THE PROPOSED CITY AND REGIONAL COUNCILS 
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ADDENDUM: ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
The major hurdle to significant constitutional reforms in Australia, especially to the model 
proposed in this paper, is to tackle politically, culturally and historically the possibility of 
abolishing the States. Thus, some would view proposals to do just that and to move from 
three tiers of government to two tiers as being almost impossible to achieve, even over the 
longer term. However, without such ambitious proposals, it isn’t possible to build a model 
that: 
• Seeks best practice in terms of assigning clear roles and responsibilities; 
• Attempts to put in place as many incentives as possible for ongoing economic reforms; 
and 
• Proposes wholesale streamlining of public administration within the Federation. 
However, with the model as set out in this paper as the benchmark, it is possible to work 
through various alternatives that still seek to achieve significant elements of both 
constitutional and economic reform. One such alternative is set out in this Addendum. This 
alternative could allay the fears of State leaders, politicians and stakeholders by retaining the 
States and increasing their number to twelve but with an accompanying significant 
consolidation of local government beneath the States. This alternative would achieve many of 
the objectives and elements of a fully implemented cities and regional approach. Such an 
alternative could serve to engender a lively debate on the range of possible reforms that 
could be achieved as part of a more near to medium term agenda. 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM MODEL 
The alternative model set out in this Addendum is based on maintaining the existing three 
tiered governance structure but seeking to achieve a more sensible allocation of roles and 
responsibilities between the three tiers as well as a substantial streamlining of public 
administration. 
The model would propose four important constitutional reform elements: 
(i) increasing the number of States (and Territories) from the current 8 to 12 in order to 
achieve a more city and regional focus for the second tier; 
(ii) reallocating some constitutional powers of national significance from the States to the 
Commonwealth, and similarly reallocating some powers of an urban and local nature 
to local government;  
(iii) streamlining significantly the third tier of government which currently consists of about 
700 local councils, by amalgamating all metropolitan councils into five ‘mega’ councils 
covering the five major cities and reducing the number of smaller city, regional and 
country based councils to less than 100; and 
(iv) the inclusion in the redrafted Constitution of provisions to formally establish a 
revamped COAG (expanded from the current 9 to 13 members) as the fundamental 
institution for a united and consolidated Federation, as well as updating and 
streamlining the current electoral provisions of the Constitution that determine the 
allocation of its members amongst the constituent States. 
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Out of this proposal, one could imagine the negotiation of constitutional reforms that would 
achieve a much improved allocation of ‘subject’ powers within the Federation as follows: 
• The Commonwealth Government having responsibility for nationally significant powers 
fundamental to the good governance of Australia as a well functioning sovereign nation, 
such as foreign affairs and defence, national economic management, business and 
financial regulation, industrial relations, social welfare, indigenous affairs, immigration, 
and postal services and communications, as well as powers over issues where the 
spillover effects are nationwide, such as water and the environment. 
• State Governments retaining all residual powers including over areas of significant 
social and economic policy within which to administer their ‘sovereign’ jurisdictions, such 
as health, education, justice and law enforcement, resources and energy, and land use 
management. 
• Local government gaining certain powers from State Governments so that they can 
properly administer their urban, regional and local affairs. Accordingly, local government 
would have powers over public transport (including the metro networks in the major 
cities), urban infrastructure and urban water, and strategic city planning, as well as the 
delivery of existing municipal services. 
While this reallocation process would likely bring major reform benefits, it needs to be 
recognised that it wouldn’t deliver on four important elements of the two-tiered constitutional 
reform model that is the central proposal of this paper. Importantly:  
(i) this alternative proposal wouldn’t achieve the allocation of ‘subject’ powers according 
to the two fundamental principles of national significance, and urban, local and 
regional relevance that form a cornerstone benchmark of the two-tiered model; 
(ii) it wouldn’t allow for the ‘subject’ powers to be further defined, by delegation, on a 
‘functional’ basis, whereby the Commonwealth Government would concentrate on 
national policy design, legislation and funding packages, and the lower tiers of 
government would concentrate on program implementation and service delivery at the 
urban, regional and local levels;  
(iii) it wouldn’t necessarily facilitate the wholesale streamlining of public administration, 
although significant dismantling of some State bureaucracies could be achieved by 
successful negotiation of major reform packages over areas such as health and 
education. It would probably be necessary to complicate further the judicial system 
with a likely expansion from 9 to 13 in the number of judicial systems; and 
(iv) it wouldn’t alleviate the tensions between States’ rights and centralism, thus 
continuing the pattern of stalled or slowing reforms as the notion of ‘national interest’ 
continues to be swamped in the mire. 
Finally, the redrafted Constitution could sensibly update and streamline the electoral 
provisions of the Constitution. The existing provisions that determine the House of 
Representatives to be, as nearly practicable as possible, twice the size of the Senate, could 
be retained, but the formula for determining the number of electorates per State could be 
simplified on a per capita basis. The House of Representatives could be retained at its 
current size of 150 members given that there would still be three tiers of government. But the 
Senate could be reduced from the current 76 to 72, by having only six Senators per State. 
Senators would serve six year terms to be achieved, as in the main proposal in this paper, by 
only half the States going to each Federal election. If the NSW/WA/SA based States went in 
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one cycle and the Vic/Qld/Tas/NT based States went in the other, the aggregate number of 
electors at each ‘half’ Senate election would be almost even. 
MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
Through the negotiations for a redrafted Constitution, the macroeconomic framework as 
proposed in the main two-tiered proposal in this paper, would still need to be achieved in full 
under the three-tier model. Establishing this framework would be a necessary condition to 
underpin the Federation, given that the 12 States would have a mixture of strong and weak 
balance sheets, and many would have longer term fiscal pressures and reliance on 
Commonwealth financial grants and HFE equalisation arrangements. 
The redrafted Constitution would thus need to require that there be a national fiscal strategy 
and framework as encapsulated in a revamped Charter of Budget Honesty that applied to all 
three levels of government. 
• This framework could achieve the aims of shifting the majority of both cyclical and long 
term fiscal risks to the Commonwealth. 
• The Charter of Budget Honesty could require that all State Governments have balanced 
budgets over the cycle, and all local councils have balanced annual budgets, and the 
provisions relating to publishing medium term fiscal strategies, structural analysis and 
pre-election material could be mandatory for the five large States, and optional for the 
remainder. 
• As well, an Intergenerational Report at least every three years could be required on a 
consolidated Commonwealth-State basis. 
It would also be imperative that all tax reform proposals set out in the main proposal be 
delivered in full. This could include setting out in the redrafted Constitution the division of 
revenue raising powers between the three tiers of Government, similar to the division of 
powers set out in the main proposal except that local government would share the proceeds 
of the new land tax. Both State stamp duties and local council rates could be abolished. 
While the States would retain, under residual powers, the right to impose onshore royalties, a 
deal should still be done through the COAG for a compensation arrangement with the 
Commonwealth for the relevant States to share in some of the proceeds of the expanded 
resource rent taxes for spending on infrastructure to support resources development. 
MICROECONOMIC REFORM 
Under this three-tiered governance model, the structures and incentives for advancing 
wholesale microeconomic reforms on an ongoing basis would be much weaker than under 
the two-tier model. In particular, while the COAG would be properly established under new 
provisions in the Constitution, the tensions between States’ rights and centralism would 
continue to obscure debate over the national interest. 
This would clearly be a COAG of a totally different nature and power structure than in the 
main two-tiered proposal. Indeed, the States would be emboldened by their enhanced 
sources of revenue and not feel as much under Commonwealth financial pressure to agree to 
reform proposals. This would necessitate hard bargaining by the Commonwealth with the 
assistance and backing of reform-minded States to achieve ongoing reforms and to persuade 
all States to be confident with the backing of their new and enhanced revenues to embrace 
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reforms as equal partners with the Commonwealth. Areas where possible major reforms 
could be advanced are set out below. 
Health Reform: The objective under the three-tiered model could still be to achieve the full 
suite of health reforms as set out in the main proposal. While setting up the networks wouldn’t 
fit as neatly into the 12 State structure, it would be imperative that the 12 States agree to 
make each network fully autonomous and independent, and to substantially dismantle their 
health bureaucracies. 
Education Reforms: Similarly with education reform, the Commonwealth should continue to 
seek full autonomy and independence for schools and to trial local education area networks 
on a voluntary basis, as well as totally revamping and reforming the VET sector. Again, the 
States should substantially dismantle their education bureaucracies. 
Industrial Relations: With this power moving to the Commonwealth, particularly over 
employees in the non-corporate sectors, the objective of achieving a single industrial system 
nationwide would still be achieved, but with all the ongoing ‘ideological’ difficulties remaining. 
Land Transport: Major reforms could be achieved in land transport by the Commonwealth 
expanding the national highway system to allow for the interconnection of all the State 
capitals, as well as introducing in partnership with the States the GPS-based road user 
charging systems, and the five mega councils introducing congestion charges to the major 
cities. In addition, the takeover of public transport by the city councils in particular could bring 
major improvements when combined with their responsibilities over strategic planning, 
infrastructure, and city and town planning. Urban development along major transport 
corridors might finally be delivered. All rail track could still be transferred to the ARTC, and 
regional passenger rail could be transferred to a new Commonwealth-owned GBE covering 
all passenger services (like the US Amtrak). 
Environment & Water: These powers would transfer to the Commonwealth given their 
spillover effects nationwide. But, as under the main proposal, the Commonwealth should 
concentrate on national environmental protection policy and assessments, with the States 
delivering on local community based programs such as landcare. Water reforms as set out in 
the main proposal could presumably still be achieved in full, with control over urban 
waterways in designated urban areas being delegated to local councils. 
Land Use Management: This power would continue to rest with the States and policy in this 
area would no doubt continue to be dominated by local vested interests. Thus, the tussles 
between competing agricultural, resources, environmental and indigenous claims would 
continue. This could be an area, however, that the COAG could have on its new forward 
agenda with the objective of devising a sensible, pragmatic but harmonised system to be 
applied by all State jurisdictions. Again, control over land use management in designated 
urban areas should be delegated by the States to local government. 
City and Town Planning: Given that these powers would move to local government, the 
major breakthrough of combining strategic planning, urban infrastructure (including public 
transport), urban water, and city and town planning could still be finally achieved, with 
hopefully much improved outcomes for urban development and infrastructure, including 
extensive densification along major transport corridors; greatly improved responsiveness of 
housing supply to demand leading to improved, housing affordability; and easier access for 
all residents to the locations of employment opportunities. 
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ATTACHMENT A.1: PROPOSED TWELVE STATES
 
 
STATE POPULATION ('000) CAPITAL 
NUMBER 
OF SEATS 
IN HOUSE 
NUMBER 
OF 
SENATORS
MAJOR CENTRES IN THE STATE 
NEW SOUTH WALES 4,655 Sydney 32 6 Sydney, Bathurst, Orange. 
NEW ENGLAND 1,488 Armidale 10 6 
Pt Macquarie, Newcastle, Central Coast, Armidale, 
Dubbo. 
MONARO 1,000 Canberra 7 6 
Canberra, Queanbeyan, Wollongong, Goulburn, Sth 
Coast. 
VICTORIA 4,854 Melbourne 33 6 
Melbourne, La Trobe, Geelong, Warrnambool, 
Ballarat. 
MURRAY-RIVERINA 864 Albury-Wodonga 6 6 Bendigo, Mildura, Albury-Wodonga, Wagga. 
QUEENSLAND 3,267 Brisbane 22 6 Brisbane, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast, Toowoomba. 
CAPRICORNIA 693 Rockhampton 5 6 Rockhampton, Gladstone, Bundaberg. Mackay 
CAPE YORK 531 Townsville 4 6 Townsville, Cairns, Mt Isa. 
WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA 2210 Perth 15 6 
Perth, Bunbury-Busselton, Kalgoorlie, Geraldton, 
Karratha. 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 1624 Adelaide 11 6 Adelaide, Barossa, Mt Gambier, Pt Pirie, Whyalla. 
TASMANIA 503 Hobart 3 6 Hobart, Launceston, Burnie, Devonport. 
NORTHERN 
AUSTRALIA 261 Darwin 2 6 Darwin, Alice Springs, Derby, Broome. 
TOTAL 21952   150 72   
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ATTACHMENT A.2: INDICATIVE MAP OF THE PROPOSED TWELVE STATES 
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ENDNOTE: RICHARD MURRAY BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
 
Richard Murray retired in 2011 after a 41 year career in the Australian 
Public Service, mainly in the Australian Treasury. 
 
He has a BEc and Postgraduate Diploma in Economics from the 
Australian National University and MSc (in economics) from the 
London School of Economics. 
 
Mr Murray commenced in the Treasury in 1970, working as a policy 
analyst and adviser in a variety of areas covering both micro and 
macroeconomic policy issues.  
 
In 1989 Mr Murray was promoted to the Senior Executive Service and over the next decade 
held various senior executive positions in the Treasury, covering macroeconomic forecasting, 
infrastructure and competition policy, banking and finance, taxation policy, international 
economy, foreign investment, budget policy and debt management. These included Treasury 
representative at the Australian High Commission, London (1993-96), Executive Member of 
the Foreign Investment Review Board (1998) and General Manager of the Treasury’s 
Domestic Economy Division (1998-2000). 
 
In 2000 Mr Murray was assigned to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet as 
head of its Economic Division. Returning to the Treasury as Chief Adviser (Corporate 
Strategy) in 2001, he was involved in significant reform of Treasury’s management model, 
corporate planning and budgeting and in the restructure of the Treasury Board and Group. 
Subsequently promoted to the position of Executive Director (Deputy Secretary) of the 
Treasury’s Fiscal Group, Mr Murray was responsible for the delivery of the 2003 and 2004 
Budgets, fiscal strategy, debt management, welfare to work reforms, health policy, higher 
education reform, innovation and industry policy and Commonwealth-State financial 
relations. He headed the Demographics Task Force that worked on policy responses to 
population aging, particularly addressing productivity, participation and population issues. 
 
In April 2005 Mr Murray took up the position in Washington, DC of Alternate Executive 
Director on the Board of the IMF, representing the Asia and the Pacific Constituency 
comprising Australia, Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Seychelles and most 
of the Pacific Island nations. In the following year he was to become Executive Director of the 
Constituency at a time when the Board faced significant IMF reform issues in relation to 
quota and voice, multilateral surveillance, new lending instruments and income and 
expenditure reforms, and later the multifaceted response by the IMF to the global financial 
crisis. 
 
In 2008 Mr Murray became Executive Director - Policy Co-ordination and Governance at the 
Treasury and served in this role until his retirement. On governance issues his 
responsibilities centred around the Treasury Board’s 2009 reassessment of the Treasury’s 
organisational strategy and corporate processes and subsequent implementation issues. Mr 
Murray’s responsibilities for overall policy co-ordination covered a variety of associated 
strategic projects, including financing issues and private sector credit availability in the wake 
of the global financial crisis, sustainable population strategy and longer term national 
broadband network, digital dividend and associated communications policy reforms.  
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PROFESSOR AJ BROWN, GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY 
 
By his own account, Richard Murray is a dreamer. However the power and significance of 
dreams should never be underestimated. 
 
In To Constitute a Nation (1999) Helen Irving argued persuasively that Australia’s present 
federation was itself the product of a ‘utopian moment’, a time of "both optimism and dismay, 
of disillusionment with old constitutional relations and confidence in the local ability to forge 
new ones." Richard Murray’s detailed vision of an alternative governance structure and 
governing strategy for Australia bears similar hallmarks – although far more optimism than 
disillusionment. His imagining of what could be, and perhaps should be, demonstrates both 
the rarity and the importance of those able to stand back and articulate a holistic picture of 
how life and government could perhaps be better. Plainly, irrespective of the merits of this 
particular proposal, we would benefit if more senior policy makers had both the time and 
talent for such thinking. 
 
The content of the Murray plan could be easily criticised. Assumptions that a two-tiered 
federation would be both more efficient and more responsive have a long history in Australia. 
However this remains an instinct for which there is little empirical evidence, and which 
studies of citizen attitudes show is unlikely to win the support of any popular consensus – 
even when a majority of citizens favour structural change in the nation’s governance. 
Constitutional lawyers such as myself could pick apart the lack of specificity regarding how 
the benefits of federalism might be preserved in this scenario: how the division of powers and 
responsibilities would be entrenched; how the constitutional prerogatives and autonomy of 
regional governments would be protected from ad hoc political incursion by an ever more 
powerful national government. These are vital concerns that preserve the present system – 
dysfunctional as it plainly is – even when only a minority think it is adequate. 
 
The thesis that the driving purpose in improving the system of government is to sustain a 
microeconomic reform agenda could also be challenged. This is nakedly the perspective of a 
career public servant from a central federal government agency for whom microeconomic 
reform is a prime, abiding agenda. But in the long term the purpose of governance is to serve 
the needs and wants of the community, defined much more broadly. 
 
Moreover, in the present term, microeconomic reform is too often a recipe for uniformity and 
centralisation in regulation and decision-making, when the case for political and institutional 
change in Australia should be based in equal measure on enhanced capacity for local and 
regional autonomy and diversity, with whatever alternative inefficiencies this might 
necessarily entail. Unfortunately, the view from Canberra too often entails a theoretical or 
idealised attachment to the idea of increased local and regional power rather than a real 
understanding of just how important this is in practice, how vital it is that it be entrenched, 
and how little of it there is under any existing or proposed arrangements. I am allowed to say 
this because I was born in Canberra. 
 
Criticisms like these should not be seen as detracting from the power of the author’s vision. 
What Richard Murray’s paper demonstrates is that it is feasible both to imagine alternative, 
arguably better ways of governing, and then develop them in enough detail to actually test 
out the putative costs and benefits in order to advance the debate as to where we might 
usefully go – out of our present unsustainable reality. Murray’s paper is important because it 
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provides a coherent national vision. It follows in the footsteps of a long history of debate that 
our fundamental governing structures are just not right. This is a debate that predates 
Federation itself, and indeed which predates many of the colonial separations that lumped us 
with our present territorial hotchpotch. 
 
The problem with such debates has been their frequent parochialism and their own ad 
hocery. Colonial separation movements, and later New State movements, have pursued the 
vision of a less centralised, more diverse federation but were too reliant on parochial 
demands for regional independence – highly difficult to realise. Visions of restructuring in 
which regions play a greater role have, until recently, been too strongly dominated by 
centralist, bureaucratic assumptions that good regional planning and outcomes need not be 
accompanied by viable, sustainable regional democracy. 
 
Trying to separate democracy and community from the fundamentals of governance systems 
is both wrong in principle and a doomed exercise in practice. As Ken Wiltshire wrote in 
Tenterfield Revisited (1991), what was missing from most 20th century debates over the 
solutions was any proposal which married federalism's divided sovereignty and the "pure 
regionalism" of unitary traditions into a "realistic alternative design." Finally, more recently, 
such conceptualisations appear to have become more feasible. Some have come from 
Wiltshire himself. Others have come from thinkers like Chris Hurford AO, who was first to 
coin the idea that Australian governance might be redeveloped around a more coherent 
framework of regions, but clearly within a federal structure, and thus perhaps be called 
‘regional states’. 
 
Whether Richard Murray’s alternative design is realistic – or not – is not the issue. The great 
contribution here is its degree of detail. It is sufficient to meet Wiltshire’s standard for a factor 
so sorely missing from the argument. It is testable. For this reason it is perhaps even more 
threatening than a general, vague dream might be to those whose job you might think it was 
to help chart the future of Australian governance. It will probably attract vehement, even 
virulent criticism for being too centralist, too Canberra-centric, too unrealistic. But that is not 
its purpose, nor its value. 
 
The value of Murray’s paper lies in lifting the standard of research and debate around the 
specific pros and cons of redistributing policy responsibility, power and institutional resources 
in particular ways to better achieve a more sustainable future for Australian society. Critics 
can nit-pick all they like, but they – like all of us – must now face this challenge. Murray 
shows we are capable of rising to it. Unless we are truly satisfied that our present federal 
system is as good is it gets, then what should be our preferred alternative; and what exactly 
would it look like? Australian history now has the benefit of the Murray vision. The question 
critics must answer is – what is theirs? Only with stimuli like these can we ever hope to 
advance the debate significantly. 
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ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ROBYN HOLLANDER, GRIFFITH 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 
A New Federation with a Cities and Regional Approach is a welcome addition to the ongoing 
debate about the Australian federation. Richard Murray has presented an ambitious proposal 
to radically restructure the Australian federation. The plan has two dimensions. The first is to 
replace the six existing states and two territories with x metropolitan and y region. The 
second is more sweeping. It addresses the distribution of roles and responsibilities and 
proposes that the commonwealth assume policy making responsibility for the bulk of 
activities with the new regions taking over the implementation role for all but the most local of 
issues. Thus Murray proposes we move from a jurisdictional federation where roles and 
responsibilities are divided between the commonwealth and the states to a functional one 
where responsibility for policy in many areas is effectively shared but the governments 
assume different roles.  
 
This commitment to radical change sets Murray’s paper apart from much of the existing work 
on federalism in Australia. Despite its centrality, federalism has attracted surprisingly little 
attention. The scholarship and commentary that does exist typically falls into one of three 
clusters. The first is largely conceptual and theoretical. It draws heavily on political and legal 
theory and is concerned with both the nature of federalism itself and its relevance in an 
Australia where big ideas tend to be underplayed and undervalued. Although the debates 
leading up to federation focused on practical problems, some of the players were interested 
in more conceptual and theoretical aspects of federalism. This interest has resurfaced 
periodically (see for example Sawer 1969; Davis 1995; Galligan 1995; Aroney 2002). 
 
These theoretical concerns have been overshadowed however by a much larger body of 
work focused on improving the workings of our existing political arrangements (see Twomey 
& Withers 2007 for a more recent example). In 1901, a French observer, Albert Métin, 
characterised Australia as having socialism with no doctrine; he could have just as easily 
characterised Australia as a federation without federalism. This has translated into a 
pragmatic approach to our federation. While Prime Minister John Howard could declare that 
“If we were starting Australia all over again, I don't think we ought to have states” (Grattan 
1991: 5), he and others before and after never seriously considered going back to the 
drawing board. Instead the attention has focused on reviewing and revising the existing 
arrangements. 
 
The third cluster has been devoted to thinking about ways in which the federation may be 
reconceptualised and reconstructed. This strand is further divided. On the one hand we have 
the work of scholars such as AJ Brown who are seeking realignment between federalist 
principles and their practice in Australia. This literature is particularly interested in questions 
of democratic legitimacy and engagement. On the other we have those, of whom Murray is 
one, who see institutional reconfiguration as a key to delivering better policy outcomes.  
Murray’s work begins by establishing a case for change, before going on to detail an 
alternative model for the Australian federation. He concludes by considering the processes 
for the transformation of our current arrangements. 
 
Policy Failure 
Murray’s case for radical transformation of the federation rests on the argument that our 
existing arrangements have failed especially in relation to building a national seamless 
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economy. The quest for a national economy has always been a central aspiration. Indeed it 
provided a key rationale for the formation of the federation in the first place and informed 
assignment of roles and responsibilities in the constitution. Hence, responsibilities for many 
of the elements then essential to a single economy, such as currency, were assigned to the 
Commonwealth. However our constitutional architects assumed that businesses would 
remain small and the volume of interstate trade modest, and they underestimated the degree 
of interstate mobility. This meant that responsibility for many aspects now considered key to 
economic prosperity, such as business regulation and education, were left with the states.  
 
For Murray and others, this represents a threat to our ongoing prosperity because of the 
resulting fragmentation and variability and also because the existence of multiple jurisdictions 
limits the opportunities for reform. Although persuasive at first glance, the situation is 
complex and it is not clear that the states are the problem that Murray suggests. National 
Competition Policy (NCP) and its younger sibling, the National Reform Agenda (NRA), 
provide examples of how our federation can work effectively and moreover how the 
existence of multiple jurisdictions can successfully promote economic reform. In the case of 
NCP two state premiers, John Bannon and Nick Greiner, were key drivers at an early stage 
(Parkin 1996). Similarly the NRA emerged as a Victorian initiative under the Premiership of 
Steve Bracks (Keddie and Smith 2009). While both NCP and NRA were primarily market 
focused, state based initiatives have not been restricted to the economic arena. For example, 
in 2007 the Council for the Australian Federation, a state and territory intergovernmental 
forum, commissioned the Garnaut Review on Climate Change which was later adopted by 
the federal government. Nor is it fair to say that the states have always underperformed 
when compared to the commonwealth in the economic reform stakes. In the case of NCP, 
the commonwealth proved to be the laggard successfully resisting pressure to deregulate 
many of the activities under its jurisdiction (Hollander 2006).  
 
We could also argue that in some areas the duplication and overlap so reviled by the critics 
has served us well (Hollander 2010). It is clear that this has been the case in relation to the 
natural environment. While having to negotiate with multiple levels of government creates an 
added level of complexity for business, especially when there are significant policy 
differences between the various governments, federalism has provided the environment with 
a higher level of protection than would otherwise be the case. Without the ‘double handling’ 
provided for under Australia’s constitution, iconic areas of natural heritage such as the Great 
Barrier Reef, Tasmania’s Franklin River and much of our forest estate would have been lost. 
While the federal government has taken leadership on many occasions, in others the states 
have moved to protect environmental values in the face of federal opposition (Hollander 
2004).  
 
System Design 
Murray proposes that Australia adopt a system which combines elements of jurisdictional 
and functional federalism. It would be jurisdictional in that powers would be divided between 
sovereign entities, but whereas the states currently enjoy a wide range of powers on paper at 
least, under Murray’s model the new regions’ powers would be strictly limited to ‘local’ issues 
such as land use planning and community infrastructure. The central government would 
resume responsibility for all other matters. This reverses our current provisions where the 
central government’s powers are carefully outlined (in section 51) and the residual lie with 
the states. While reducing the powers of subnational levels of government should eliminate 
some of the current complexity, the potential for familiar issues to re-emerge in the future 
remains. In 1901, it is probable that the division of powers looked perfectly reasonable. What 
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was not foreseeable was how quickly it would become anachronistic. We can anticipate that 
what looks rational in 2012 is similarly likely to lose its relevance over time. The strains may 
already be showing in areas such as water. While distribution can be managed locally, 
catchments often straddle boundaries and during the long drought, state governments in 
Victoria and elsewhere attempted to source water from other catchments to provide for their 
thirsty capitals. Similarly the emergence of a conurbation in South East Queensland to 
beyond the current NSW border in the south, to Ipswich in the west and into the Sunshine 
Coast in the north, means that urban planning will need to be considered from an 
intergovernmental perspective. All of this suggests that efforts to draw clear lines between 
regions will remain elusive.  
 
The functional elements of Murray’s proposed design also raise questions. The Federal 
Republic of Germany provides us with an example of how a functional federation operates. In 
Germany, policy in many areas is set at the national level and then implemented by the 
Länder governments at state level. However, unlike the Australian Senate the German upper 
house, the Bundesrat, does represent state interests primarily because it is composed of 
Länder delegates who have considerable opportunity to contribute to the decision making 
process. In the Australian context it is difficult to see how COAG could be made to play a 
similar role, especially if the Senate is to remain part of the institutional framework and 
COAG continues to be dominated by the Prime Minister.  
 
In many ways, the new institutional structure more closely resembles a decentralised unitary 
system such as existed in the United Kingdom prior to devolution whereby the central 
government allocates specific responsibilities to various bodies such regional authorities, 
local government and local management committees and boards. In the case of the UK 
these bodies assumed a significant degree of autonomy in determining how services were 
delivered but were ultimately subject to authority of the government in Westminster. While 
this might be the path we wish to travel we need to be clear that this is where we are going. 
We might also need to ask why many countries with a unitary form of government are opting 
for higher degrees of decentralisation and devolution. 
 
Constitutional Change 
The final part of Murray’s paper is devoted to considering the process by which the changes 
he proposes might be achieved. Australia’s record is a poor one; of the 44 proposals put to 
referenda, only 8 have succeeded, the majority of which were concerned with administrative 
matters. Williams (2012) argues that much of this failure can be attributed to the choices 
made by successive governments in matters such as timing, question design and process. 
While this suggests that referenda are not doomed to fail, it is still not clear that the 
Australian polity would embrace such a radical change. As Murray notes, the transformation 
would require the support of the states that would need to be committed to their own 
destruction. Such a stance is not unknown although the circumstances tend to be quite 
particular. For example, in 1922 the Queensland Legislative Council voted to abolish itself 
but in this case the government which had the power to appoint members had ensured the 
abolitionists were in the majority. In cases of more profound change – as in Spain following 
the death of Franco, where the Cortes General effectively voted for its own destruction – the 
old regime had little legitimacy. 
 
It is also hard to imagine that the Australian electorate would be sympathetic to the 
concentration of power that would result for the proposed changes. As the republican debate 
of the mid 1990s showed, there is a widespread reluctance to further empower politicians 
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and the proposed framework could amplify existing disquiet around the power of the 
executive in our two-party parliamentary democracy. It is interesting to observe that the 
concentration of power that characterises centralised unitary systems is often offset by the 
existence of multiple parties which act to disperse that power. Thus countries such as 
Sweden and New Zealand, which are characterised by dominant single chamber 
parliaments, also have electoral systems which help smaller parties to win seats. 
 
Conclusion 
In 1969 Sawer characterised Australia as the ‘frozen continent’. Despite the absence of 
formal constitutional change, however, today’s federation is vastly different from the one 
envisaged by the founders over a century ago. Much of the change that we have witnessed 
thus far has been pragmatic – designed to solve pressing policy problems - rather than part 
of any carefully planned reconstruction (Hollander and Patapan 2007). Our federation will 
continue to evolve. While we might disagree on many aspects of the detail, thoughtful 
contributions such as Murray’s expand our horizons and challenge us to think more 
expansively about what our federation could look like in the future.  
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PROFESSOR BRIAN HEAD, UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND 
 
The challenge of reforming federalism 
Richard Murray argues persuasively that the Australian federation has generally served us 
well for more than a century but that its failings now demand serious attention. This is not the 
first, nor the last, attempt to reconsider Australian federalism from the perspective of offering 
radical reform options. Whereas some previous reform projects have focused on 
constitutional law and referenda processes, Murray’s contribution to the debate is anchored 
in a strategic policy approach, and it is certainly among the more thoughtful and impressive 
of such contributions. From Murray’s vantage-point, working in a key central agency of the 
federal government, it is perhaps not surprising that securing strategic policy outcomes is 
seen as the driver for governance reform, and that the recommended directions serve to 
confirm and extend the centralist trends of the last fifty years.  
 
From this perspective, the failures of federalism are attributable in large measure to the 
current state/territory level, and the proposed abolition of the states would provide an 
opportunity to reconfigure the weak local level of government. The preferred model involves 
replacing both levels with 24 metropolitan and regional councils. In this revised array, the five 
largest cities would attain new roles as integrated metropolitan city councils. The only areas 
not subject to major boundary and role changes are Tasmania and the Northern Territory, 
which would remain intact but as regional councils. The size of these 24 councils has been 
carefully considered, with attention to the various issues of population, geography, and 
history; but with large variations remaining in terms of size and resources.  
 
Schemes for improving the structures and processes of the Australian federation have been 
numerous over the years. They have emerged as punctuated interventions disturbing the 
otherwise grey routines of government. Reform schemes have tended to emerge as bursts of 
activity spurred by perceived opportunities to tap into a vein of reformist sentiment, whether 
legal, political, economic, or regional. For example, plans for rational reform flourished briefly 
in the era of post-war reconstruction (e.g. Greenwood 1946), resurfaced in the Whitlam era 
which witnessed lively debates about the powers of the federal government in many policy 
spheres (1973-75), took other pathways in the constitutional review initiatives of the late 
1980s and the republic debate of the 1990s, and very notably the various ‘new federalism’ 
negotiations associated with the role of COAG especially in the early 1990s and again very 
recently. To complete the historical background, there have also been isolated bursts of 
separatist sentiment (in Western Australia) and regionalist sentiments that fuelled ‘New 
States’ movements in northern New South Wales and northern Queensland at various times. 
Indeed the creation of new States within the boundaries of existing States by the referendum 
process has been seen as the easiest way of diversifying the federation and recognising 
regional interests (see Wiltshire 2007).  
 
Richard Murray does not dwell on the history of constitutional reform schemes, nor the sad 
track record of failed referenda. He is not focused on the politics of transition or the role of 
citizens and the mass media in advocating for major change. Rather, his analysis focuses on 
how best to achieve national policy goals and objectives, arguing that the current system is 
inefficient and an obstacle to future achievements. This analysis then leads to the claim that 
it is necessary to re-design appropriate roles, structures and responsibilities of the levels of 
government, leading readily to his preferred two-level model. Essentially the argument is that 
achieving the national policy objectives of effective economic management, together with 
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many related key policy goals, would best be served by confirming the federal government’s 
supreme role in most areas of strategic policy, abolishing the current eight state and territory 
jurisdictions, and replacing them with two dozen substantial city and regional councils.  
 
Over the previous decades, reformists have provided various blueprints advocating 
anywhere between 12 and 100 regional-level bodies to replace the current state and 
municipal levels (see Brown 2007; Head 2007). Murray’s model is solidly grounded in 
arguing for 24 such bodies, although the specific numbers and their specific boundaries 
would be certain to attract strong debate around the nation. In deference to the politics of 
transition, Murray also offers a more modest alternative model that sets the general direction 
for larger changes in future – twelve states (gained essentially by subdividing NSW and 
Queensland), and consolidating over 600 local government bodies into fewer than 100 local 
councils including an increased number of metropolitan councils.  
 
It would be easy to become preoccupied with specific arguments about the best division of 
roles and responsibilities, negotiating the tax revenue and equalisation issues, and settling 
jurisdictional boundaries, together with all the consequences for the electoral systems and 
accountability processes. Instead, these comments will focus on some fundamentals in 
public policy and the political system. Among these important issues are whether the case for 
change has been persuasively made, whether the solutions are well crafted and coherent, 
whether the reform plans would attract wide political support, whether the reforms need to be 
accepted as a total package or as a measured sequence of specific changes, and whether 
any proposed transitional arrangements (if supported politically) would be administratively 
manageable.  
 
In the policy literature, it has become common to distinguish between the ‘problem’ stream of 
agenda-setting, the ‘solution’ stream of options and recipes, and the ‘political’ stream of 
bargaining and support (Kingdon 2003). The reform of federalism is not one problem but a 
meta-challenge encompassing a complex series of problems. The strategies available for 
defining, championing and implementing complex reforms are uncertain. The chair of the 
Productivity Commission has eloquently argued that the necessary ingredients include clear 
goals, good analysis, and the political will to resist special interests (Banks 2010). This might 
work in specific areas of micro-economic policy reform, as evidenced by the suite of 
productivity and competition policy reforms agreed by COAG since the 1990s. It has proved 
rather more difficult to mobilise understanding and support around ‘better governance’ for the 
future of the federation, since the breadth and depth of issues are so difficult to comprehend 
and market. The case for steady change within the federal arrangements has been well put 
by other analysts (e.g. Twomey & Withers 2007) who argue that important step-level 
improvements are still possible without structural renovation. This is also the position of State 
Premiers, who remain important players in sowing suspicion about centralisation in Canberra 
and who influence the agenda concerning policy issues that directly affect many services for 
citizens. It is possible that some kind of future crisis could trigger a groundswell of support for 
fundamental change, and that exceptional leaders could step forward to steer a reform 
process over many years. In the meantime, Richard Murray has planted a big flag for 
intelligent centralisation, with enhanced roles for a regional level of governance in service 
delivery. There is much to appreciate and to ponder in his diagnoses of the problems and the 
required future directions for the Australian federation. 
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PROFESSOR ALAN FENNA, CURTIN UNIVERSITY 
 
 
“To every complex problem, there is a simple solution…” 
 
Thinking boldly about how the federation should look is a useful exercise. Much of what 
exists in any political system exists because of circumstances prevailing and decisions taken 
long ago. Inertia rules. Quite possibly that inertia and the blindness to alternatives that is 
characteristic of any society means rule by the dead hand of the past. Clean sheet design 
could alert us to better ways of organising our political and service delivery systems. 
 
This proposal for sweeping and comprehensive reform of Australia’s federal system reflects 
an understandable frustration with the decay of the original model, and with the way 
inadequacies in the way Australia’s urban agglomerations are governed. At its heart is the 
proposal that the states be abolished and that their position as the constituent units of the 
federation be assumed by a modestly larger number of major metropolitan and non-
metropolitan regional governments. That scenario has been canvassed for almost as long as 
Australian government has been in operation. This version aims to retain a federal character, 
but one with only two instead of three levels of government and where a much larger range 
of functions are formally made the responsibility of the central government. This would make 
Australia unique among federations which, without exception, have extensive networks of 
local government in addition to the government of the union and the governments of the 
constituent units. 
 
The question of whether such a radical revamping could ever be achieved is logically quite 
separate from the question of whether it is a worthwhile objective. The fact that it is 
undoubtedly unachievable makes discussion of its merit no less interesting or relevant. A 
utopian goal — such as communism — influences the direction of reform, which may be 
significant even if movement in that direction is modest. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear 
whether proceeding in this direction would deliver many or any of the desired benefits. Flaws 
in the regional governance model have been well identified by Twomey (2008), and rather 
than repeat what she has said I will simply note a few of the main question marks that hang 
over this proposal. 
 
Although pitched as a reformed federalism, effectively this is a proposal for a unitary state. 
As is acknowledged in an understated way a number of times in the paper, “the move to a 
two-tiered based constitutional model for the Federation would shift the balance of power 
further towards central government”. That in itself is not necessarily a fault, but there is no 
point in pretending otherwise. It is certainly not the first time that someone has advocated 
abolishing the federal system; what would that achieve and what would it cost? 
 
The present proposal would appear to provide two compelling benefits: an improvement in 
the governance of Australia’s metropolitan centres and greater independence for Australia’s 
regional and remote areas. It is a moot point whether greater independence for regional and 
remote areas would be a good thing. It is certainly the case that Australia’s metropolitan 
areas could benefit from more comprehensive governance arrangements.  
 
A long-overdue reconfiguring of metropolitan governance is entirely feasible within Australia’s 
existing federal framework. So the real question is: should we jettison the states? The 
argument seems to be that a) many state functions have shifted to the centre already; b) 
there is little clarity left in the way roles and responsibilities are divided; c) the states lack 
sufficient revenue to execute their tasks properly; and d) we could disembarrass ourselves of 
the somewhat tendentiously described “dead hand of bloated state bureaucracies”.  
 
There is certainly some truth in a, b and c. The Commonwealth has re-written the federal 
system by assuming substantial new responsibilities in a range of State policy domains, in no 
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small part thanks to pronounced vertical fiscal imbalance that it has engineered and the 
result is evident in widespread ambiguities of responsibility. The problem is that there is little 
reason to think that Australian federalism’s useful features will be retained or its undesirable 
features necessarily expunged by abolition of the states.  
 
To retain the balance between two levels of government that is the essence of federalism 
requires that the constituent units be ‘polities’ in their own right, responsible for a meaningful 
range of tasks, possessing some sense of identity as political communities, and being 
significant sites of democratic political representation and contestation. With the states 
eviscerated, there would be no constituent units and no federalism in Australia. There would 
be local governments of a pragmatic administrative nature supported by desultory citizen 
interest. 
 
Meanwhile it is not as if the hard work of service delivery in health care, education and social 
services or the difficult decisions in regulation and infrastructure investment would simply 
disappear with the euthanasia of the “bloated state bureaucracies”. As the GFC spending 
programs illustrated, the Commonwealth is blessedly free of those ongoing challenges and 
when it does take them on, nothing is as straightforward as it seems. Quite possibly, if the 
states did not exist the Commonwealth would have to invent them.  
 
“To every complex problem there is a simple solution… and it is usually wrong”. 
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THE AUTHOR’S RESPONSE TO COMMENTARIES 
 
Including amendments to the allocation of jurisdictional powers from those set out in 
the paper 
 
Richard Murray 
 
I would like to very much thank AJ Brown, Robyn Hollander, Brian Head and Alan Fenna for 
the time and effort they have taken to analyse my paper and to supply such thoughtful, 
knowledgeable and constructive comments. I have taken these comments very seriously 
indeed, prompting me to pen this response in advance of publication. In this response, I have 
sought to answer some of the criticisms levelled at the paper, but also to concede that my 
model for constitutional reform should be amended in advance of publication in terms of the 
jurisdictional allocation of powers to get the balance right in terms of the structure, processes 
and incentives built into the model. 
 
Vision for our Federation 
Firstly, I have deliberately presented in my paper what I consider to be a vision of what we 
could aspire our Federation to be. As stated by AJ Brown, whether my design could become 
reality or not isn’t the issue. What I have intended is to set out a benchmark reform model 
that can be analysed and tested, and most importantly provoke serious debate. There are at 
least five fundamental questions that I consider should be debated and addressed: 
 
1) Are we really satisfied that the Constitution of 1901, although it has evolved over 111 
years, is a satisfactory basis for governing our continental nation for this 21st century? 
2) If over the 20th century, Australia has evolved demographically, economically, socially 
and environmentally, as a nation of five highly urbanised cities but with a sizeable 
minority living across a patchwork of diverse and vibrant regional communities, why 
shouldn’t our Federation reflect that reality? 
3) Given the increasing concentration of power at the centre of our Federation, shouldn’t 
we be asking the question of whether or not this is where we want our Federation to 
be at? 
4) Given that we are a sparsely populated but continental nation, shouldn’t we be 
seriously examining whether or not we really need three layers of government, or 
would a move to a two-tiered, more consolidated, governance structure be more 
viable and workable? 
5) For how much longer can we pretend that the States and Territories can play their 
proper role in the Federation if we don’t seriously address the allocation of taxation 
powers and seek to eliminate the unsustainable VFI through tax reform. 
 
Defending and Building a Better Federation 
The second point I want to make is that I have written this paper as a staunch federalist 
seeking to build a new Federation that is best suited to the good governance of Australia for 
the 21st century. In this regard, Box 2.3 benchmarks my Federation model against four 
important federalism principles and I stand by the robustness and credibility of that analysis. 
 
In terms of my view of the significance of the achievement of Federation in 1901, I am indeed 
amazed at the fact that in many deliberations of our Founding Fathers, there seemed to be a 
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long held sense that Federation into the continental nation of Australia was inevitable and, 
accordingly, in 1901, the Founding Fathers achieved just that. 
 
I also take great pride that Australia walks tall as one of the continental nations that, in the 
aftermath of the American Revolution, has become a democratic federation. The group of 
federations I have in mind comprise the United States, Australia, Canada, Brazil, India, South 
Africa and Mexico. 
 
Also, I want to make it quite clear that my career mainly in the Australian Treasury, but also 
at Prime Minister and Cabinet and at senior postings in Washington and London, have not 
biased my views towards centralised power and I agree that all wisdom doesn’t reside in 
Canberra, far from it. I have worked over many years with my State and Territory colleagues 
for whom I have total confidence and respect. In all this, I am sceptical and suspicious of the 
continual encroachment of centralised powers on the structure and workings of the 
Federation. That is in many ways why we need to debate the state of the Federation as a 
matter of high priority. 
 
Economic Framework and Pragmatic Approach 
The third point I wish to make is that I am not a constitutional expert but an economic and 
strategic policy adviser and therefore my paper is written from that perspective. In this 
regard, I think I am in good company with many Founding Fathers who, armed with a vision 
of creating a new continental nation, devoted much debate to the role of government 
(Conservatives vs Liberals), in order to address the pressing economic and social issues (eg 
free trade vs protectionism) that the Federation would need to face. 
 
Also, like the Founding Fathers, I have taken both a theoretic and pragmatic approach to my 
analysis and indeed the Addendum to the paper sets out an alternative 12 States model that 
brings to the fore the need for pragmatism and compromise in any exercise of constitutional 
reform. 
 
Getting the Balance Right 
In terms of getting the right balance in my constitutional reform model, I haven’t deliberately 
set out to make our Federation even more centralist than it has now become. I think that 
successive Federal Governments and the High Court have already done more than a 
sufficient job of that for us. My intention was to recognise the reality of this increased 
concentration of power in the context of Australia being a strong and vibrant trading nation 
competing in a globalised world. But, at the same time, I have sought to preserve 
decentralised elements that would keep in check this concentrated power, and preserve 
choice, diversity and competition as vital elements of the Federation. 
 
In terms of how the Federation should be structured to achieve the right balance, my 
proposal for a revamped and enhanced COAG enshrined in the Constitution is of 
fundamental importance. I wouldn’t envisage that the COAG should be a body where the 
Prime Minister can continue to dominate over the subsidiary level of government. Indeed, I 
would see the five City Lord Mayors as powerful COAG players just as the Premiers are 
today but with the necessary taxation resources to back them up, and for some of them to 
bring the zeal of reform that we have seen in the past from the likes of Nick Greiner and Jeff 
Kennett. I would also see several dynamic Regional Councils, such as say, Monaro, 
Northern Rivers, Gold Coast, Cape York and Derwent-Tamar-Mersey, playing useful 
supporting roles in most reform exercises. 
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I am concerned, however, that both Robyn Hollander and Alan Fenna have expressed 
concerns that my model resembles more a decentralised unitary system rather than a true 
federation. I couldn’t imagine a much worse constitutional direction for Australia to take. This 
indicates to me that the jurisdictional allocation of ‘subject’ powers that I have proposed in my 
paper does not have the right balance, and in the final section of this response below, I have 
made amendments to that allocation in advance of the publication of the paper. 
 
Amendments to the Allocation of Powers 
As set out in the paper, the jurisdictional allocation of powers as I have proposed, would be 
contained in its own Allocation of Powers Part of the Constitution with three distinct Sections, 
as follows: 
 
1) Federal powers would be those of national significance including powers central to 
the governance of Australia as a sovereign nation such as foreign affairs and 
defence; and powers relating to our place in a globalised world such as economic 
management. Importantly, this would include my proposed allocation of powers from 
the States and Territories to the Federal Government (including taxation powers) over 
resources development and the energy market, given the significance of these 
sectors to the future of our nation in the 21st century. 
2) Powers of urban, regional and local relevance would be allocated to the Cities and 
Regions and relate to those issues contained within their jurisdictions such as public 
transport, urban infrastructure, town planning and urban development. I would see 
this allocation as an opportunity for a major and long overdue reform vital to the future 
strategic planning and consolidated development of our five major cities. 
3) Shared powers would be those covering areas of national importance applied on a 
nationwide basis. These powers would be specifically subject to my proposed 
overarching principle laid down in the Constitution that the roles between the two tiers 
of government would firstly be defined on a functional basis with the Federal 
Government to concentrate on policy design, financing regimes and legislation, while 
the Cities and Regions would need to design and provide all program and service 
delivery.  
 
My paper then proposes that these powers be allocated constitutionally to the Federal 
Government, subject to flexibility provisions in the Constitution that would require agreement 
to be made with the Cities and Regions for program and service delivery by them to citizens 
and communities. I now concede that this allocation of shared powers constitutionally to the 
Federal Government would not bring an appropriate balance to my model and could 
potentially undermine the role of the Cities and Regions in any deliberations of the COAG in 
seeking agreements on such areas of national importance. Therefore, I would propose the 
following allocation of powers to correct this imbalance of my paper, prior to publication: 
 
• In terms of economic powers, the myriad of existing State-based business regulations 
such as those the subject of COAG’s Seamless National Economy processes should be 
allocated to the Cities and Regions, not the Federal Government. 
• In terms of social policy, social welfare and immigration should remain Federal powers, 
but with agreement required through the COAG on how community and family support 
services and migrant settlement services would best be delivered to citizens and 
communities by the City and Regional Councils on the Federal Government’s behalf. 
On the other hand, on the abolition of the States and Territories, the Cities and Regions 
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would have taken over as major owners and stakeholders in the vitally important areas 
of health and education. Therefore, in order for them to be able to be powerful 
participants with the Federal Government in any COAG negotiations on health and 
education, I would now propose that these powers rest with the Cities and Regions, not 
with the Federal Government.  
• In relation to environmental issues, the allocation of environmental powers needs to 
take into account the important international dimensions of environmental policy as well 
as the spillover effects of many environmental issues across jurisdictions, and, indeed, 
across the whole nation. Therefore, environmental powers should be allocated to the 
Federal Government as my paper proposes. However, the issues of land management 
and water are not as straightforward and could be handled pragmatically in a different 
way. While these two areas have important national ramifications and significant 
spillover effects, they are also fundamental to the wellbeing of many local communities 
within all jurisdictions. Therefore, I would now propose that the allocation of powers 
over land management and water resources be to the Cities and Regions and not to the 
Federal Government, and it should be left to the COAG to negotiate the best direction 
of both land management and water reforms into the future. 
 
Table 1. Allocation of powers 
CONSTUTIONAL 
ALLOCATION TO: 
FEDERAL POWERS CITY AND 
REGIONAL 
POWERS 
SHARED POWERS - 
Subject to functionality 
principle and COAG 
agreement 
FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
Foreign Affairs and 
Defence. 
Economic Management.
Industrial Relations. 
Resources and Energy. 
Indigenous Affairs. 
 Social Welfare. 
Immigration. 
Environment. 
CITY AND 
REGIONAL 
COUNCILS 
 Urban Strategic 
Planning. 
Public Transport. 
Urban Infrastructure.
Urban and Town 
Development. 
Health. 
Education. 
Business Regulation. 
Land Management. 
Water Resources. 
 
